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ABSTRACT
U.S. FOREIGN AID IN AN AGE OF TERROR
by
Brendan Mark Morris
Dr. Michele Kuenzi, Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Foreign aid has become a growing importance of U.S. foreign policy in the last few
years. As the U.S. is committing more aid towards the developing world, questions over
the purpose of this expansion of aid have emerged. While the traditional perspectives on
the purpose of foreign aid of either serving the strategic interests of the donor or the
development interest of the recipients are given as potential reasoning behind this
allocation of aid, the impact of the U.S.’s involvement in the War on Terror may have
more of a significant impact on the U.S.’s current foreign aid allocation. Foreign aid
allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) may have felt the greatest impact from the War on
Terror, as the region has now been recognized for its geostrategic importance to the U.S.
due to its high risk of instability and state failure. Looking at the potential determinants of
U.S. foreign aid before and after the start of the War on Terror, this study asks whether
this new security environment has had any profound effect on U.S. aid allocation to SSA.
A multivariate panel regression with a partial fixed effects model is employed to identify
the determinants of U.S. aid during these time periods. Differences in aid allocation that
have been found between these two time periods suggest that the War on Terror has had a
significant, yet limited, effect on U.S. foreign aid SSA.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Since the implementation of the Marshall Plan after the end of the Second World
War, foreign aid1 has been an important part of the United States’s foreign policy
(Lancaster, 1999: 83). This importance has grown within the last eight years, with U.S.
foreign aid allocation reaching its highest levels since the 1960s, nearly double the
amount allocated in the previous decade. The impact of the U.S.’s involvement in the
War on Terror may have a significant impact on the U.S.’s current foreign aid allocation.
Foreign aid allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) may have felt the greatest impact
from the War on Terror, with the region now being recognized for its strategic
importance in protecting U.S. national security (Kraxberger, 2005). The threats which
U.S. faces in the War on Terror have increased the U.S.’s focus on the dangers from
failing and failed states, a political symptom which has plagued many SSA states since
their independence. Foreign aid to SSA may have increased significantly to support
development and to prevent terrorist groups from establishing bases to conduct
operations within the region. Because foreign aid that has been allocated to SSA in the
past has been allocated to further the strategic interests of the U.S. more than promoting
the development of the recipients, it is important to ask how the U.S.’s foreign aid
allocation to this region has been affected by the War on Terror.
Questioning the impact of the War on Terror on U.S. foreign aid allocation to
SSA is important for understanding the role foreign aid plays for the U.S. as well as the

1

The term “foreign aid,” or simply “aid,” in this study will refer to Official Development
Assistance (ODA) specified in the OECD statistical records.
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U.S.’s foreign policy towards SSA. To undertake this task, this study will attempt to
identify and compare the most significant determinants of the U.S.’s foreign aid
allocation to SSA in the periods before and after the start of the War on Terror. The
reasons why the U.S. allocates aid to SSA is especially interesting, as the region has
traditionally been of little importance to the U.S.’s strategic interest and the last four
decades of foreign aid to the region has not produced significant development results to
permit the continuing of its allocation.
The traditional perspectives on foreign aid explain aid allocation either around the
donors’ egotistical interests or the donors’ altruistic concerns towards the recipients.
According to these perspectives, the U.S. would either provide foreign aid to SSA in the
hope of gaining some form of benefit to its economic, political, or security interests, or it
would provide aid to the region based upon a sense of moral obligation to promote
poverty alleviation. By introducing the potential effect that the War on Terror has on the
U.S.’s foreign aid decisions to SSA in addition to these perspectives, one may develop a
more refined understanding of the purpose of U.S. foreign aid in this new security
environment. SSA contains many factors which makes it highly susceptible to the spread
of terrorist movements (Cilliers, 2003). These factors include close proximity of the
Middle East to the volatile Horn of Africa territory, the rise of Islamic terrorist groups
connected to al Qaeda in parts of the region, a history of terrorist attacks targeted against
SSA regimes and the U.S., and the potential for individuals to be recruited in the region
to carry out attacks against the U.S. Reviewing these factors, one may see the dangers of
terrorism within the region and the reasons why the U.S. would wish to focus on
preventing and containing these dangers.
2

The War on Terror and Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa
The attacks on September 11, 2001 have been “widely interpreted to demonstrate
beyond dispute that conflict and unrest in one part of the world could spill over and
destroy the lives of thousands on the other side of the globe” (Abrahamsen, 2004: 678).
Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. has been engaged in a global conflict against
transnational terrorist organizations and states which sponsor and support such groups.
Described as a “battle of arms and a battle of ideas,” the War on Terror under U.S.
leadership has focused on several strategic goals, including: advancing effective
democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism; preventing attacks by
terrorist networks; denying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to rogue states and
terrorist allies who seek to use them; denying terrorists the support and sanctuary of
rogue states; denying terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and
launching pad for terror; and laying the foundations and building the institutions and
structures needed to help ensure ultimate success in defeating terrorism. (National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006:1).
The strategy laid out above shows a focus for the U.S. in the War on Terror on not
only engaging terrorist threats, but also developing regions to prevent terrorist groups
from emerging in an area. Democracy in this strategy is listed as the long-term solution to
preventing terrorism groups from arising. Earlier strategies for the U.S. during the
beginning of the War on Terror list preventing weak states to fail as a critical strategy in
preventing terrorism as well (U.S. National Security Strategy, 2002). Though the U.S. has
a primary target in the War on Terror with al Qaeda, terrorist groups, especially radical
Islamic groups, in many developing countries have been noted for their potential threat to
3

U.S. interests (Rabasa, 2009). SSA has been particularly recognized as a major battlefront
in the War on Terror for the U.S. due to its weak states and connections to terrorism.
Reviewing SSA’s connections with the terrorism, it is not a surprise that the U.S.
has focused on the region’s importance to U.S. national security. As SSA contains
territories with close proximity to the Middle East, the U.S. would have several reasons
to be concerned with the spread of terrorist movements into the region. With porous
borders throughout the region and cultural and religious ties between some of the SSA
states and terrorist hotbeds such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the U.S. has labeled part of
SSA, the Horn of Africa, as a frontline in the War on Terror (Lyman and Morrison,
2004). The focus on the threat within the Horn of Africa can be seen with the U.S.
conducting military operations throughout the region, training SSA states in
counterterrorism as well as carrying out its own attacks against suspected terrorist targets.
The establishment of African Command (AFRICOM) to serve as a regional military
command for the U.S.’s operations in SSA is more evidence to the growing importance
of the region in the battle against terrorism and signs that the U.S. may also be interested
in using SSA as a base for its operations against threats within the Middle East.
The existence of acting terrorist organizations throughout the region is another
important factor to consider in regards to potential terrorist threats in SSA. Groups in the
region, such as al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) and al-Shabaab based in Somalia, al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria and Mauritania, the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) in northern Uganda, and the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in
South Africa, have conducted terrorist attacks against multiple targets. Of these particular
groups, al-Shabaab and AQIM are both listed under the U.S. State Department’s Foreign
4

Terrorist Organization list (U.S. Department of State, 2010) with both groups having
perceived links to al Qaeda. While it has been argued that these groups and other terrorist
groups in SSA are focused on regional targets and politics and not the U.S. (Piombo,
2007; Berschinski, 2007), previous attacks against the U.S. in the region represent key
factors that could increase U.S. interest in SSA security.
Table 1 below lists the number of terrorist attacks and causalities from attacks in
SSA from 1991-2007. Of these attacks, the dual bombings of American embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the hotel bombing and the attempt to shoot down an
Israeli airplane in Mombasa, Kenya in 2002 shows the existence of terrorist cells that are
focused on attacking the U.S. and its allies. The fact that the perpetrators of the embassy
attacks have connections to al Qaeda makes the potential threat of terrorism against the
U.S. in the region even greater. Other links to al Qaeda, such as states providing safe
havens for al Qaeda’s top leaders (such as Sudan for Osama bin Laden in the 1990s),
financial support for the organization through illicit trade (such as al Qaeda’s connections
to conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone; see Farah, 2002), and potential recruiting networks
for al Qaeda within the region show the potential for SSA to be the next battlefront in the
War on Terror.
Counterterrorism through Foreign Aid
While terrorism should be an obvious concern for the U.S. in regard to its foreign
aid to SSA, it is important to look at the leading factors within the region that would
influence the spread of terrorism and how the U.S. could us foreign aid to prevent this
threat from spreading further. The threat of terrorism in SSA is based around “problems
of poverty, limited infrastructure, poor education and health services, frequently slow and
5

Table 1

sometimes volatile rates of economic growth, low levels of investment and high
unemployment rates, and, in a number of cases, ethnic, religious, class, and regional
cleavages and weak and corrupt governments” (Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005: 1-2). As
a USAID report notes, “these circumstances entrench poverty, nurture injustice, and fuel
anger and alienation,” potentially leading individuals to violence and terrorism (USAID,
2002).
As the U.S. has identified development as one of its three pillars of national
security(U.S. National Security Strategy, 2002), along with defense and diplomacy,
6

expanding development through increasing foreign aid to prevent states from failing may
be considered to be a plausible strategy for the U.S. towards SSA. Development can help
alleviate the threat of terrorism by providing support to economic, social, technical, and
political dimensions of SSA states. By providing support to build up democratic
institutions, improving access to education and healthcare, and taking effective measures
against some of the region’s biggest epidemics, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, U.S.
foreign aid can build up the SSA’s states capabilities to improve security and prevent the
rise of international terrorism in the region from occurring.
Foreign aid may, however, have negative effects to the region. Since 1960, the
U.S. has allocated over US$80 billion2 (OECD, 2010) in foreign aid to SSA. This foreign
aid has been viewed by some to have produced few positive results in the area of
development and has kept weak states and corrupt leaders in existence (Van de Wall,
2001; Moyo, 2009). A major problem with the foreign aid that has been allocated to SSA
in the past, especially during the Cold War, is that the foreign aid was allocated more on
the interests of the U.S. than the interests of the SSA recipient states. Foreign aid
allocated during this time has been described as having nothing to do with the region
itself (Congressional Research Service, 2008: 12), as the U.S. ignored the realities of
SSA’s political and economic situation (Kraxberger, 2005). The disregard of the realities
of the SSA states and provision of aid to corrupt regimes contributed to the weakening or
failure of many states.
Studies of U.S. foreign aid allocation during the Cold War have observed that the
U.S.’s strategic interests have a greater impact on allocation decisions than the
2

Constant 2008 US$
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development interests of the recipients (Griffin and Enos, 1970; McKinlay and Little,
1977; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, 1998). The end of the Cold War has been viewed as
an opportunity for U.S. foreign aid to focus on the economic and political development of
SSA and not follow just the strategic interest of the U.S. (Clough, 1992; Van de Walle,
2001). If the U.S. is focused on preventing terrorism, then the U.S.’s allocation of aid
should be influenced by factors related to the prevention of the emergence of failing and
failed states and the development needs of the recipients. If the U.S.’s economic interests
are found as the major determinants of its foreign aid, then one may assume that the U.S.
is still not focusing on the dangers of instability within the region and is still following
the traditional practices of its aid allocation.

Methodology of the Study
In order to find whether the War on Terror has had an effect on U.S. foreign aid
allocation, this study will examine the major determinants of U.S. foreign aid since the
end of the Cold War and how they have changed since the start of the War on Terror. To
test the main hypothesis that the War on Terror has had a profound effect on U.S. foreign
aid allocation to SSA, this study will test the identified determinants of U.S. foreign aid
before and after the start of the War on Terror. The time periods for the two analyses are
1992-2000 and 2002-2008. As the War on Terror has been described as an important
change in U.S. foreign policy (U.S. National Security Strategy, 2002), significant
changes in the determinants of foreign aid between the two time periods would generally
support the hypothesis that the War on Terror has influenced U.S. foreign aid allocation.
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To test these determinants, this study will employ a partial fixed effects3 multivariate
cross-sectional time-series regression model using panel corrected standard errors which
will test for the significance of specific determinant variables in determining U.S. foreign
aid allocation levels for the SSA states.4
To test the main hypothesis that the War on Terror on U.S. has influenced U.S.
foreign aid allocation, this study will test several sub-hypotheses on foreign aid allocation
based on perspectives which explain U.S. foreign aid to this region. These perspectives
emphasize the strategic economic interest of the U.S. and the development interest of the
recipient SSA states as the leading explanations of foreign aid allocation. Testing
hypotheses based around these perspectives and comparing their results between the time
periods before and after the start of the War on Terror, this study will attempt to find any
adverse changes in the purpose behind U.S. aid. To further test the potential effect of the
War on Terror, several additional hypotheses based around specific interests for the U.S.
in the War on Terror will be included to see if they have any effect on U.S. aid allocation.
Only a select few of these hypotheses will be tested to keep a parsimonious model, with

3

The partial fixed effects method employed in this study consists of finding specific cases in the
data that may have a strong influence on the analysis and include these cases as dummy variables in the
model to control for their effect. Influential cases are identified by comparing the summed residuals of the
cases to five times the mean value of the dependent variable, with any cases with a higher value than this
threshold being included as dummy variables in the model.
4

The SAA states include: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Republic of
Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea- Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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additional hypotheses being tested in separate models. The primary model for this study
will test the following hypotheses:
1) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that have stronger
trade relationships with the U.S.
2) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with greater
economic needs.
3) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with higher levels of
freedom.
4) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that are at risk of
failing.
The first hypothesis bases U.S. foreign aid levels off of the strategic economic
interests of the U.S. More specifically, aid levels are based on the goal of increasing trade
with the region. Finding support for this hypothesis in the two time periods would show
the lack of effect of the War on Terror in influencing the U.S.’s aid allocation towards
helping develop the region and, instead, having the U.S. follow its traditional purposes of
foreign aid.
The second hypothesis is that the U.S.’s foreign aid allocation is based on the
economic and development needs of the recipients. Finding that the U.S. is providing
foreign aid to the region on the basis of need would show not only the U.S. has not
continued to follow traditional practices of foreign aid allocation which occurred during
the Cold War, but any difference between the two time frames would suggest the War on
Terror had an impact on the U.S.’s view towards the region.
According to the third hypothesis, the level of democracy and human rights
performance of a recipient state are major influences on U.S. foreign aid. According to
the beliefs of U.S. policymakers, democracy and freedom are necessary components of
10

development (USAID, 2002). The War on Terror may have negative effects on the
preference for democracy though, as the focus on failing states and states that are
engaged against terrorist movements may require the U.S. to provide aid to more
repressive regimes. A change of focus on democracy and human rights protection before
and after the War on Terror will show the effect of the War on Terror, as well as the
U.S.’s true priorities in this new security environment.
The final hypothesis is specific to the War on Terror. According to this
hypothesis, preventing the threat of terrorism in SSA is an important determinant of U.S.
foreign aid allocation. Testing whether the risk of a recipient state failing has any effect
on U.S. foreign aid allocation will help illuminate the effect of the War on Terror on aid
allocation. Scholars have pointed to how U.S. policy has reflected little regard for the
stability of SSA states (Kraxberger, 2005). Finding that U.S. foreign aid allocation is
affected by the potential for states to fail since the start of the War on Terror would
suggest that preventing terrorism has become a goal pursued through foreign aid.
The results from this study show interesting findings regarding how the U.S. has
applied its foreign aid to SSA. A lack of focus from the U.S. regarding its strategic
economic interests towards SSA can be seen before and after the War on Terror. The U.S.
appears not focus on democracy and the protection of human rights in the region with its
foreign aid as well. The results do show a significant change in focus of U.S. aid after the
start on the War on Terror, with a stronger focus on poorer states and states which have
been susceptible to instability and failure. These results would indicate that the War on
Terror has had some kind of an effect on U.S. aid allocation to SSA.

11

The focus of this study will add to the literature on foreign aid, as the effect of the
War on Terror on foreign aid has only begun to be addressed by scholars (see Moss,
Roodman, and Standley, 2006; Fleck and Kilby, 2008). Looking at SSA only and using
the U.S.’s main concern towards the region, i.e. state failure, this study will be able to test
whether the U.S. is actually following its own national security policy. Going forward,
this study shall first provide a review of the literature on the theoretical purposes of
foreign aid as well as a brief history of U.S. foreign aid practices towards the SSA.
Following this initial review, the study will then develop the model of analysis and
explain the conceptualization and the operationalization of the hypotheses which will be
tested. Following the analysis of the data, this study will explain the results and shed light
on any irregularities in the data. The conclusion of this study will review the results on
the analysis and discuss the implications which the War on Terror has on U.S. foreign aid
and U.S. foreign policy towards SSA.

12

CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN AID TO SUBSAHARAN AFRICA
In order to test whether the War on Terror has had a profound effect on U.S.
foreign aid allocation to SSA, it is important for this study to review the different
theoretical perspectives on foreign aid found in the literature explain the purpose of aid
allocation. By examining the different rationales behind the allocation of foreign aid, as
well as the relationship which the U.S. shares with SSA in regards to aid, this study will
present the theoretical foundations from which the study’s hypotheses can be derived. As
it is impossible for this study to unearth and explain the purposes of the U.S.’s foreign aid
allocation in their entirety, this review of the literature will examine what appear to be
considered the most important purposes of giving aid.
The main body of scholarly literature on foreign aid can be divided into three
groups: allocation studies, aid effectiveness studies, and foreign aid organizational
studies. The allocation studies on aid, which is the basis for this study, are some of the
more traditional studies on foreign aid. This type of study offers important insight into
what type of concerns and interest aid donors have in deciding to whom to provide aid to
and how much aid to give. There are different forms of allocation studies, including
exploratory studies that test allocation trends against theoretical allocation interests
(Dollar and Alesina, 2000; Feeny and McGillivray, 2002; Tuman and Ayoub, 2004);
studies that test whether donors are paying attention to specific concerns, such as human
rights (Alesina and Weder, 2002; Neumayer, 2003; Lebovic and Voeten, 2009) or
rewarding recipients for support of a donor’s foreign policy (Dudley and Montmarquett,
13

1976; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006); and studies which test allocation levels against
estimated levels based off of recipients’ development needs (Trumbull and Wall, 1994).
These types of studies help hold donors accountable, as they can test whether donors’
allocation practices match their stated policies on foreign aid.
Effectiveness studies of foreign aid tend to overlook the possible purposes of why
donors provide aid and assume that the foreign aid has been allocated primarily for the
development purposes of the recipient states. 5 Studies of this kind have included looking
into how foreign aid has affected democracy (Knack, 2001; 2004), corruption (Tavares,
2003), and economic growth (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) in recipient states. These types
of studies not only show if foreign aid is actually working in creating development, but
also help hold recipients accountable by testing whether foreign aid has any adverse
effects on the recipients.
A similar focus is found in the final type of study on foreign aid, which looks at
the organization of foreign aid and donor aid agencies with the objective of making
foreign aid more effective in promoting sustainable development. Studies of this type
focus on the lack of positive results from foreign aid and promote positive reform by
providing quantitative models of hypothetical allocation designs and qualitative evidence
of the positive and negative aspects of foreign aid allocation and organization (Tendler,
1975; Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005; Brainard, 2006; Lancaster, 2008).

5

The differences in the focus and perspectives between the allocation and effectiveness studies
can be seen with who is undertaking them. Allocation studies, which look at the purpose of foreign aid in
the context of international relations, tend to be traditionally undertaken by political scientists.
Effectiveness studies, which overlook the foreign aid’s role in international relations, have been dominated
mostly by economists (Brainard, 2006: 5; Lancaster, 1999: 6).
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These different types of studies each offer insight into what the primary purpose
for foreign aid is. By revealing the hidden interests of donors through their allocation
tendencies, as well as the politics behind foreign aid, the literature shows a complex
debate on foreign aid’s role in international relations. In an attempt to significantly add to
this debate, this study will try to answer how the U.S. has used its aid in the War on
Terror by testing different determinants of aid that focus on the threat of global terrorist
groups and failing states. Turning now to the theoretical perspectives on foreign aid, this
study will try to build the foundations for the hypotheses which will be tested.

Theoretical Perspectives on Foreign Aid
Theories on foreign aid allocation have been distinguished in previous studies by
the issue of who foreign aid is supposed to serve, either the donor of the aid or the
recipient states. Questioning whether donors give out aid based on egotistical or altruistic
purposes has filled the literature on foreign aid (Griffin and Enos, 1970; Abbott, 1973;
Dollar and Alesina, 2000; Feeny and McGillivray, 2002; Simon and McGillivray, 2002).
These studies have pointed to two theoretical perspectives that explain the allocation of
aid through the basic premise of who the aid is suppose to serve, the donor or the
recipients.
The first theoretical perspective, the “donor strategic interest” perspective,
follows the theoretical framework of the neorealist view of international relations.
According to this perspective, donors only allocate foreign aid to benefit their own
national interests. These interests can include deterring national security threats, creating
beneficial economic relations between the donor and recipient, and achieving positive
15

political gains from the recipient (Black, 1968). Following this perspective, hypotheses
are shaped around the interests the U.S. can gain from SSA.
The second perspective, the “development interest of the recipients” perspective,
follows the idealist view of international relations. According to this perspective, foreign
aid is allocated mainly to serve the interests of the recipients. Following this line of
thinking, donors’ allocation patterns would be influenced by the humanitarian concerns
the donors have towards the developing states (Lumsdaine, 1993). Deriving hypotheses
from this perspective, this study will be able to test whether the recipients’ development
needs influence U.S. foreign aid allocation. As the donor community has also pushed for
more accountability and evidence of positive results in regards to development from
foreign aid allocations (Monterrey Consensus, 2002; Dollar and Alesina, 2000), testing
whether recipients with desirable types of governments and economic policies that
promote the efficient use of foreign aid receive more aid than states who do not hold
these qualities will shed more light on the significance of this perspective in explaining
the priorities of the U.S. foreign aid.
An additional potential factor on recent foreign aid allocation that needs to be
considered is how foreign aid has been impacted by the War on Terror. The potential
effect from the War on Terror may have a strong influence on the strength of these
perspectives explaining U.S. aid allocation. Several recent studies have begun to look at
how the current focus on international terrorism has affected foreign aid allocation and
the U.S.’s relationship with SSA (Moss, Roodman, and Standley, 2005; Fleck and Kilby,
2008; Azam and Thelen, 2009; Van de Walle, 2009). This potential factor on foreign aid
follows the neorealist view, similar to the strategic interest perspective, where the U.S.
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would allocate foreign aid in its strategic interest of preventing the expansion of terrorism
in the region.
Using foreign aid to prevent the expansion of terrorism in SSA may also be
considered to be in line with the development interest perspective as well, as the U.S.
may attempt to prevent the expansion of terrorism by aiding in the economic
development of the region and preventing unstable states from failing. If the War on
Terror has affected the foreign aid decisions of the U.S., one would expect factors related
to the threat of terrorism, such as the level of instability in a state, previous terrorist
attacks within a state, and any cooperation from a recipient with the U.S.’s
counterterrorism operations in the region, attracting more aid to a recipient. Hypotheses
can be derived from these potential factors which may indicate a direct effect of the War
on Terror on U.S. aid. Hypotheses related to non-direct links to terrorism, such as the size
of Muslim populations in recipient states, can also be included under this study to find
any overarching policy against Islamic terrorism has been enacted by the U.S.
It is important to review the two perspectives on foreign aid allocation in greater
detail and provide some conceptualization of the different factors of U.S. foreign aid. The
sections below will discuss the strategic interest perspective and the development interest
perspective through their theoretical assumptions as well as their relation to the
observations of U.S. foreign aid allocation and the U.S.’s relationship with SSA. A
discussion of the conceptualization of the different aspects of the War on Terror will also
follow.

17

The Strategic Interest Perspective on Foreign Aid
The strategic interest perspective on foreign aid identifies aid as a tool of
statecraft for a donor to use to achieve its foreign policy objectives. This perspective has
been adopted by scholars of foreign aid (Black, 1968; Griffin and Enos, 1970; Lancaster,
1999) and is generally the most accepted purpose of aid found in the literature (McKinlay
and Little, 1977; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, 1998; Alesina and Weder, 2002; Lebovic
and Voeten, 2009). One of the assumptions of the neorealist theory in which this
perspective is based off of maintains “that states are rational actors characterized by a
decision-making process leading to choices based on maximizing the national interest”
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997: 58). According to this assumption, donors would use
foreign aid in a strategic manner that would benefit their own national interest by
providing aid to specific recipient states. The basis of aid allocation under this
perspective places an emphasis on how aid can benefit the donor foremost, rejecting the
claim that donors would allocate aid simply out of any humanitarian concern towards
recipient states (Griffin and Enos, 1970).
Following the rationales that have been given for the allocation of aid, consisting
of defense, economic, political, and humanitarian concerns (Black, 1968: 15-20), aid
allocation under this perspective may be considered a function of reciprocity. This is seen
with the view of foreign aid serving as a payment to recipient states for providing some
type of economic, security, or political return to the donor state. Even the giving of aid
based on humanitarian concerns may be interpreted as giving the donor some type of
gratitude from recipient states, thereby increasing the donor’s “soft power” (Dudley and
Montmarquette, 1976; Arvin and Barillas, 2002).
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In regards to U.S. foreign aid under this perspective, U.S. aid has been noted to
have “developed from a temporary post-war measure for the relief and reconstruction of
war-torn economies into an extremely sophisticated and permanent instrument of
American foreign policy” (Abbott, 1973: 2). On record, the purpose of U.S. foreign aid is
explained in the “U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961” with: “AN ACT to promote the
foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting peoples of
the world in their efforts towards economic development and internal and external
security, and for other purposes” (2003: 18). According to the Act, U.S. foreign aid is
mainly intended to serve the interests of the U.S. by aiding recipients with their own
internal development. This policy appears to have foreign aid benefit the U.S.’s national
interest indirectly by aiding the interests of the recipients; a relationship which does not
fit into the strategic interest perspective. The realities of its aid allocation point to other
intentions than just development though. A stark example of this is U.S. foreign aid that
is allocated the Middle East, where concerns over development and democracy are
overlooked for more strategic interests that benefit the U.S. directly (Cronin and Ghani,
2006: 203).
In order for the strategic interest perspective to be applicable to U.S. foreign aid to
SSA, the SSA states would need to contain some form of valuable return the U.S. may
gain from its aid. What exactly is in the U.S.’s strategic interest that can be gained from
SSA is not altogether clear. It has been noted by some scholars that one of the oldest and
most enduring purposes of the U.S. foreign aid has been to counter security threats
(Cronin and Ghani, 2006). This potential purpose of aid has been used to explain the
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U.S.’s aid allocation to SSA during the Cold War, where the U.S. attempted to contain
the expansion of communism by providing aid to client states (Moyo, 2009: 23).
The expansion of communism is no longer considered to be a major threat to the
U.S.’s national security though, and aid to SSA has outlived the Cold War (Schraeder,
Hook, and Taylor, 1998: 294). SSA has been noted to contain many threats, including
humanitarian crises from war, famine, and disease, which may have a potentially
detrimental impact on the U.S. (Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005; Brainard, 2006). Even
though it has been argued that the U.S. has traditionally neglected these threats
(Kraxberger, 2005), an attempt by the U.S. to alleviate these potential threats through
allocating its foreign aid would only succeed by promoting the development of the
region. Again, this would mean that the U.S. would only benefit indirectly, which does
not fit into the strategic interest perspective.
There may be other strategic interests which the U.S. may wish to seek by
allocating aid towards SSA. These could include buying favor within a recipient state to
establish military bases, gaining political cooperation with the U.S.’s foreign policy, and
establishing economic trade relations with the region which may benefit the U.S.
(Lancaster, 1999: 75-6).6 Having access to a state for the purpose of having U.S. military
bases is important to the U.S.’s ability to remain as the world’s mightiest military power.
Allocation studies have even found this interest to be a significant determinant in the
U.S.’s aid allocation (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, 1998). With SSA’s proximity to the
Middle East, this interest is even greater in the War on Terror (Schraeder, 2006). The
6

Aid may also serve less strategic interests as well, such as giving more power to the U.S.‘s
ambassadors within a recipient country or as a symbolic policy to be announced during visits from high
profile by leaders (Lancaster, 1999).
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creation of AFRICOM to serve as the U.S.’s newest regional military command is
testament to this belief. This type of determinant is unfortunately limited in this study, as
the U.S. has been unable to establish a base due to SSA states’ apprehensiveness towards
AFRICOM’s actual purpose and effect on the region (Bah and Aning, 2007).7
Economic interests are another strategic interest which the U.S. may wish to
pursue through its aid allocation. Some studies have looked at the effect that economic
interests have had on U.S. aid allocations (McKinlay and Little, 1977). Increased trade to
the region was a major policy issue for the U.S. towards SSA after the end of the Cold
War. The U.S. has implemented a trade relationship with the region through the African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), signed into law in May of 2000. The act states the
U.S.’s interest, as “sub-Saharan Africa represents a region of enormous economic
potential and of enduring political significance to the United States” (Trade and
Development Act, 2000: 3). Under AGOA, the U.S. has developed trade policies that
allow for a beneficial trade relationship to exist between the U.S. and SSA. Trade from
AGOA has seen a high level of disproportionality between U.S. exports and imports to
the region, with the U.S. importing roughly five times the value of goods compared to the
amount it has exported to the region (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2009; see Figure 1).
While this trend appears to benefit SSA more than the U.S., it is important to see what
exactly the U.S. has been importing from the region.

7

The U.S. has been given access to Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti for its Combined Joint Task
Force Horn Africa (CJTF-HOA) operations.
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According to the AGOA statistics, over 90% of the imports brought in from
AGOA program were from petroleum products (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2009:
2). Providing aid to the region to develop the oil producing capacity appears to be a major
interest which the U.S could pursue through aid. Obtaining oil from SSA has gained a lot
of attention in the U.S., where oil from SSA has been viewed as a suitable substitute to an
uneasy supply from the Middle East (Volman, 2003).

Figure 1

$U.S. Billons

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 2009

There may be a problem with the U.S. using aid to increase their access to trade
with SSA, however. The AGOA act has the stated goal of reforming SSA economies to
market-oriented systems that would promote growth and reduce the dependency on
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foreign aid (AGOA, 2009). As giving foreign aid lost a lot of support in Congress after
the end of the Cold War, increased trade to the SSA was intended to be a substitute for
aid. If the U.S. is following these intentions through AGOA, then aid should have
decreased to states that have established trade relations with the U.S. While hypotheses
can be tested on the effect of the U.S.’s trade with SSA and SSA oil exporting to the
U.S., the analysis will need to take into account this potential discrepancy in the analysis.
The Development Interest Perspective on Foreign Aid
The development interest theoretical perspective on foreign aid follows the belief
that foreign aid is allocated with the purpose to serve the interests of the recipients in
regards to their needs for sustainable development. The criteria of foreign aid from the
OECD states that foreign aid (ODA) is for developmental purposes that serve the
development of the recipient state only (OECD, 2008). These restrictions place heavy
emphasis on humanitarian concern and the recipients’ needs as the major influence
behind aid allocation. This view towards the purpose of foreign aid can be compared to a
state’s use of social and economic welfare programs as safety nets for their poorest
members of the society (Noel and Therien, 1995). Following this perspective on the
purpose of aid, one would expect to see higher levels of aid going to those who need help
the most rather than to states which have relatively better off populations.
Though scholars have traditionally rejected the humanitarian concerns of donors
influencing aid allocation (McKinlay and Little, 1977; Feeny and McGillivray, 2002: 11),
allocation studies have found some evidence that humanitarianism does have some effect
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on foreign aid.8 Some idealist scholars have pointed to qualitative evidence that suggests
that the strategic national interest of donors cannot explain aid allocation alone and that
humanitarian intentions still remain a viable influence on foreign aid allocation.
Lumsdaine points to the lack of support for increasing foreign aid from “Cold Warriors,”
or national security centered congressional members and policymakers, and the desire to
increase aid within more liberal minded politicians as evidence that aid is not primarily
allocated in the interests of the donor (1993: 31). Supporters of this perspective have
pointed to the use of moral reasoning, as well as national interests, from political leaders
when discussing the allocation of aid (Riddell, 1987: 62). This can be seen with President
George W. Bush in his arguments for aid to Africa:
America’s approach to Africa stems from both our ideals and our interests [italics
added]. We believe that every human life is precious. We believe that our brothers
and sisters in Africa have dignity and value because they bear the mark of our
Creator. We believe our spirit is renewed when we help African children and
families live and thrive. Africa is also increasingly vital to our strategic interests.
We have seen that conditions on the other side of the world can have a direct
impact on our own security. We know that if Africa were to continue on the old
path of decline, it would be more likely to produce failed states, foster ideologies
of radicalism, and spread violence across borders. (Woolley and Peters, 2010)

8

Different aspects of allocation studies have lead to finding evidence of humanitarianism in aid
allocation. These include the time period which aid allocation is studied, with studies focusing on aid
allocation after the Cold War finding more evidence of donors focusing less on their own strategic interests
(McGillivray, 2005), and the focus on specific donors, such as studies looking at Japanese foreign aid
allocation that have found evidence of humanitarianism (Tuman and Ayoub, 2004). Studies focusing on the
U.S. foreign aid have found little evidence of the U.S. explicitly focusing on the development of the
recipients (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor, 1998; Alesina and Weder, 2002). Note, Schraeder’s study find
evidence that the U.S. provide more aid on average to worse off economic states, but explain this result as
an unintentional consequence of the U.S.’s ignorance in providing more aid to strategic states, such as
Zaire, that were highly unstable and are plagued by low economic growth (1998: 310-311).
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This type of argument on the duality over the purpose of aid shows the false
dichotomy the debate on foreign aid presents with aid as either being allocated for only
the donor’s interests or the recipients’ needs (Riddell, 1987). Other evidence shows this
belief as well, as the U.S.’s stated policy directives in regards to aid represent two
separate purposes from its foreign assistance institutions. The U.S. State Department
(DOS) and its foreign assistance organization, USAID, both post mission statements that
represent almost contradictory purposes of its foreign aid. The DOS mission for foreign
aid reads: “To create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of
the American people and the international community;” compared with USAID’s
mission: “to provide economic, development, and humanitarian assistance around the
world in support of the foreign policy goals of the U.S.” (Lancaster and van Dusen, 2005:
7-8). The DOS mission for aid represents an idealist view where aid benefits not only the
U.S., but the also the “international community.” USAID, on the other hand, explains aid
in terms of pure national interest. These two beliefs from organizations heavily involved
in aid allocation clearly show the confusion over the true purpose of foreign aid within
U.S. foreign policy, allowing for the belief that foreign aid can be allocated around
altruistic beliefs and not solely for the national interest of the donor.9
It is easier to accept that U.S. foreign aid to SSA has some altruistic purposes than
to accept that aid to other regions of the world, such as the Middle East, which contain

9

The difference within these mission statements of who foreign aid is suppose is intended to serve
is interesting, as the idealist and realist/neorealist views held by the DOS and USAID appear to contrary to
their core purposes. The DOS statement is clearly idealist, though the concern of the DOS is achieving U.S.
foreign policy and not with the betterment of the “international community.” USAID holds on to a more
realist focus in their mission statement, but operate in a more idealist environment of aiding the least
developed nations of the world.
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considerable economic and security interests to the U.S. SSA’s low human development
indicator (HDI) ratings on a whole compared to the rest of the world indicate the vital
need for assistance (see Figures 3 and 4). With this profound need of assistance for
development, donors, such as the U.S., may feel more incline to provide foreign aid
towards this region based around altruistic concerns rather than their own self-interest.
The figures below indicate SSA has been consistently below the average human
development level for the entire world and can be seen as being the least developed of all
of the developing regions. Western powers have traditionally felt some sort of
responsibility towards ensuring the development of SSA, with some of this responsibility
based around guilt felt over slavery and colonialism (Van de Walle, 2001: 191). This
feeling of responsibility towards the region can be seen with on average twenty-five
percent of foreign aid from OECD DAC members going to the region since 1960
(OECD, 2010). SSA also represents a region that has played little strategic interest to the
U.S. (Kraxberger, 2005), traditionally being viewed as in Europe’s sphere of influence.
While the independence of the SSA states after the Second World War brought some
attention to the region, SSA has continually been overlooked by the U.S. compared to its
interest in other regions of the world. This low level of importance would theoretically
mean that the aid provided by the U.S. to SSA would be based off more altruistic
concerns than any egotistical interest the U.S. would have towards the region.
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Figure 2

Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2009

Figure 3

Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2009

U.S. foreign aid going to the SSA has been viewed as being driven by nonhumanitarian concerns, however, especially during the Cold War (Moyo, 2009).
Continued foreign aid to corrupt and tyrannical leaders, such as Mobutu in Zaire and Doe
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in Liberia, to shore up support against communist movements, represents some of the key
examples of the problems with the development interest perspective. Though some
scholars have argued that the Cold War had little effect on aid allocation to the region
(Van de Walle, 2001: 196), studies have shown that the U.S. has not taken much concern
in achieving effective development in regards to democracy and human rights (Alesina
and Weder, 2002; Lebovic and Voeten, 2009).10
If the U.S.’s foreign aid went through a “moral descent” during the Cold War
(Eberstadt, 1988), then it is important to see how aid has changed since the Cold War
ended. As foreign aid declined after the end of the Cold War, it is reasonable to believe
that the little aid that went to SSA was for development purposes for the recipients. Since
SSA held a low strategic interest towards the U.S.’s global interests after the Cold War
(Kraxberger, 2005), there would appear to be little interests that the U.S. would seek from
the allocation of its aid to the region. A sense of foreign aid’s failures in creating
development also emerged at this time, with a string of reforms revolving around
accountability of the recipients. According to the Monterrey Consensus on reforming
foreign assistance, the international donors would now be committed to promoting
“sound policies, good governance at all levels and the rule of law” (Monterrey
Consensus, 2002: 5).
Much of this new type of thinking towards foreign aid and international
development has come after the publication of the well-cited Burnside and Dollar (2000)
article, which found positive development results within recipients when foreign aid was
10

Neumayer finds evidence of civil and political rights having some influence on bilateral aid
allocation, but the focus on human rights is not consistent enough to be a significant consideration for
foreign aid donors (2003).
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allocated into a “good policy environment.” This good policy environment includes
sound fiscal, monetary, and trade policies that caused foreign aid to be used in a
responsible manner that did not allow the aid to be squandered through corruption. A
push for more democracy in the region was included in these calls for reform, as it was
viewed by western donors, especially the U.S., that democracy would be the answer to
the development problems of SSA (Moyo, 2009).
Allocation studies looking at the period at the end of the Cold War have found
donors paying more attention to governance and other development criteria (Dollar and
Alesina, 2000; Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; McGillivray, 2005). Studies that focus on
U.S. allocation specifically, though, have found the U.S. not paying attention to the
quality of governments in regards to human and political rights (Lebovic and Voeten,
2009). While the actual quality of governance has been overlooked by the U.S., some
studies have found that the U.S. does favor democracies with its allocation (Alesina and
Weder, 2002). Dollar and Alesina (2000) have found, controlling for aid to Israel and
Egypt, that the U.S.’s aid is targeted towards poverty, democracy, and openness. This
type of finding supports the perspective that the U.S. would allocate its aid to support the
SSA states’ interests. Deriving hypotheses based around the donors’ preference towards
sound economic policies and level of democracy and political rights, along with
hypotheses that test the level of need within recipients, this study will be able to test
whether the U.S. has any altruistic concerns towards the region.
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Potential Effect of the War on Terror on Foreign Aid
As this study’s focus is on the effect of the War on Terror, it is important to
review the different aspects of the War on Terror to understand how this new security
environment may have affected U.S. foreign aid. Following the strategic interest
perspective on foreign aid, one may view the potential effects of the War on Terror
influencing U.S. aid to be allocated in a manner that promotes the U.S. national security
interest of preventing terrorist groups from expanding in the region. This potential use of
foreign aid is similar to the foreign aid allocated during the Cold War, where the U.S.
provided aid as a tool of containment against communism (Korb, 2008). The War on
Terror may have caused the U.S. focus on the development of the recipient states more as
well, as the development of the recipients through the use of foreign aid may be required
for the U.S. to prevent the threat of global terrorist movements from strengthening
(Lancaster and Van Dusen, 2005; Korb, 2008).
Scholars have looked at how certain political environments have affected foreign
aid in the past (McKinlay and Little, 1977; Clough, 1992; Brainard, 2006; Fleck and
Kilby, 2008; Azam and Thelen, 2009). As scholars like these have looked at how foreign
aid has been affected either by the Cold War, the post-Cold War, or the War on Terror,
one can argue that the security environment which foreign aid is allocated in has an effect
on how aid is allocated and deserves deeper analysis into its actual effect on aid
allocation practices.
Figure 4 shows the total U.S. foreign aid allocation from 1960-2008. Reviewing
the U.S.’s foreign aid trend since the 1960’s, one can see the fluctuations in aid allocation
with each change in security environment with the Cold War, post-Cold War, and the
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War on Terror. While aid dropped during the latter stages of the Cold War, U.S. foreign
aid reaches its lowest point during the post-Cold War period. This is a time the U.S. faced
little threat from rival powers, limiting the use of foreign aid as a strategic tool of U.S.
foreign policy. The War on Terror, starting in 2001, shows the beginning rise of U.S. aid
to its highest point, clearly representing an effect the latest security environment has had
on U.S. aid allocation.

Figure 4

Source: OECD Stat Extracts, 2009

The international security environments have also have had an impact on the
U.S.’s relationship towards SSA as well. During the Cold War, U.S. interest with SSA
was viewed to be limited towards the U.S.’s desire to contain communism (Schraeder,
Hook, and Taylor, 1998; Korb, 2008: 27). This security interest of the U.S. has also been
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found to influence other donors’ aid allocation to the region.11 This focus on communism
has had an effect on the threat which the U.S. faces today, as the U.S. ignored the realities
of the region’s economic and political circumstances. This neglect allowed for aid to be
wasted on corrupt dictators, leading to complete state failures throughout the region (Van
de Walle, 2001; Kraxberger, 2005).
The post-Cold War period saw a significant change in the U.S.’s relationship with
SSA. For starters, the decline of aid and a beginning focus on aid effectiveness saw the
U.S. dropping old policies of supporting corrupt regimes in the region (Radelet, 2003).
While the focus on the use of foreign aid changed, the U.S.’s neglect of the region still
remained due to the lack of strategic importance in which the region had towards the U.S.
This neglect culminated with the U.S. withholding any type of military assistance to
prevent some of the worst crises the region and the world have ever seen. The lack of
effort to stop the genocide in Rwanda is the greatest example of this neglect (Copson,
2007:4).12
The War on Terror has greatly affected the U.S.’s relationship with SSA. Some
scholars have seen similarities in the U.S.’s relationship with SSA during the War on
Terror with their relationship during the Cold War (Schraeder, 2006: 198-199), as SSA
has been viewed to be potentially used by the U.S. as a battleground for proxy wars and

11

Tuman and Ayoub (2004) find Japanese ODA to 35 SSA states to be partly influenced by U.S.
security interests, indicating pressure from the U.S. on other donors to follow U.S. security concerns.
12

The U.S.’s failure to establish peace and security in Somalia during the early 1990’s,
culminating with the death of 18 U.S. soldiers and over 1,000 Somali deaths during an operation on 3-4
October, 1993, has been argued as the leading cause of the U.S.’s reluctance to send peacekeeping forces to
SSA. Besides Rwanda, the U.S.’s reluctance to send in peacekeepers can be seen with Liberia in 2003 and
into Darfur from 2003-2009.
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where foreign aid to the region is allocated based off of the U.S.’s interests only. The
War on Terror, though, requires the U.S. to pay attention to the political and economic
conditions, to prevent states from failing (USAID, 2002).
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, U.S. foreign policy has been
clearly shaped by the threat of international terrorism (Dollar, 2008). With the 9/11
attacks, policymakers saw failed states as being a greater threat to the U.S. than the
traditional conquering powers from previous decades (U.S. National Security Strategy,
2002). What can be considered a failed state and how do these types of states threaten
U.S. national security? Different views on state failure offer various criteria of what
constitutes a failed state. Failed states can be described in basic terms as being “unable to
control their borders, their economy has deteriorated, they are involved in bitter violent
struggles, there is no evidence of functioning infrastructure, and their political institutions
lack any form of legitimacy” (Howard, 2010: 10). Various criteria of what constitutes a
failed state exist in the literature. According to Rotberg, failed states are states whose
governments have loss legitimacy within their publics, where they are overtaken by
internal violence and cannot provide the political goods, such as education and security,
to their citizens (2003). Other views on what constitutes a failed state look at the
existence of a political disturbance within a state as evidence of failure. According to the
Political Instability Task Force (PITF), failed states are states that have experienced an
adverse regime change, an ethnic or revolutionary war, or a genocide or policide (PITF,
2010).
While the cause of failure for states in not universal, the characteristics of a failed
state appear to exist in some form throughout all failed states. These characteristics
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include violence, corruption, and humanitarian suffering. While the existence of these
characteristics does not cause failure and strong stable states may suffer from some these
characteristics momentarily, failed states exhibit these characteristics in a profound and
destructive manner. Violence in failed states can consist of insurgent movements against
the ruling regime, violence across ethnic lines over the control of resources, and violence
from the government used to control and repress its citizens (Rotberg, 2003: 5).
Corruption is another visible characteristic of failed states, as it replaces the legitimate
functions of the government with predatory practices which regimes to hold on to power
(Bates, 2008).13 Humanitarian suffering within failed states is also prevalent, caused from
violence or the breakdown of infrastructure and institutions, where disease and hunger
overtake parts of the society.
The threat of failed states towards the U.S. comes from this political
phenomenon’s causal link “to increased and widespread humanitarian suffering, regional
instability, and transnational threats of international organized crime and terrorism”
(Milliken, 2003: 12). The ability of terrorist groups to take advantage of the chaos within
failed states can be seen as a major threat for the U.S. Failed states allow for terrorist
groups to establish bases, freely cross between borders, prepare for attacks by carrying
out elicit operations through organized crime such as drug smuggling to raise funds, and
recruit followers from the desperate populations which surround them.
SSA clearly contains states which are at risk of failing or have already failed.
States such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Sierra Leone
have been described as either failed or even collapsed, as with the case of Somalia where
13

Bates indicates corruption as leading cause of failure as well.
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any evidence of the state has completely disappeared (Rotberg, 2003). A number of other
states have experienced some form of political disturbance, which the PITF indicates as
evidence of total or partial state failure. Table 2 lists the number of political disturbances
in SSA from 1991-2007 listed in the PITF datasets. Evidence of terrorist groups such as
al Qaeda operating in these failed states, with these groups establishing bases, setting up
regional terrorist operations, and profiting from illicit trade operations, exemplifies the
threat of terrorism the U.S. would wish to contain.

Table 2

The U.S. recognition of the region as a being a central location to the threat of
terrorism is a sign of the effect of the War on Terror on the U.S.’s policy towards the
SSA. With terrorist groups tied to al Qaeda operating out of the Sahel region and the
Horn of Africa, some analysts view the probability of international terrorism emerging in
the region as only a matter of time (Cilliers, 2003). Though some view the threat from
terrorism in SSA as being misleading (Piombo, 2007; Berschinski, 2007; Bah and Aning,
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2008),14 the U.S. has launched several counterterrorism policies and programs within the
region that provide counterterrorism training and support to SSA states. Some of these
programs include the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and its successor, the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which has the mission of “enhancing the
indigenous capacity of governments in the Pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger,
Nigeria, and Senegal) to confront the challenge posed by terrorist organizations in the
region” by focusing on counterterrorism, democratic governance, and military assistance
from the U.S. (AFRICOM, 2009). Another regional security program is the Operation
Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), which includes ten African states (Algeria,
Burkina Faso, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal).
OEF-TS supports the TSCTP program by focusing on overall security and cooperation
rather than solely on counterterrorism ( AFRICOM, 2009).
The U.S.’s own military action in the region is another sign of how important the
threat of terrorism in the SSA is to the U.S. The establishment of AFRICOM, which is
self-described as a “new type of command” that understands the relationships between
security, development, diplomacy and prosperity in creating security in Africa or the
region(AFRICOM, 2009), is testament to how serious the U.S.’s focus on SSA is.15 The

14

This belief that the threat of terrorism in SSA is overstated is based around the fact that most
terrorist groups in the region are focused on regional targets and are not globally orientated. Also, the belief
that failed states would benefit terrorist groups has been argued to be exaggerated, as terrorist groups would
have just as hard of a time establishing itself in the chaos of a failed state as legitimate governments would.
15

Skepticism does exist towards the U.S.’s actual interest in AFRICOM (Bah and Aning, 2007).
AFRICOM’s predecessors, most notably the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor
the Africa Contingency Training Assistance (ACOTA), ultimately lost policymakers’ interest as a reliable
security policy. The U.S.’s unwillingness to send troops to stop African crises since the debacle of its
operation in Somalia in 1993 may be a testament to the U.S.’s disregard towards achieving true security in
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U.S. carrying out operations against terrorist targets in Somalia and supporting the
removal of the Islamic Courts from power in Somalia by Ethiopian forces are more signs
that the U.S. is taking a heavier interest in the security situation in SSA since the
beginning of the War on Terror.
To face the threat of failing states, the U.S. has developed a new interest in
achieving sustainable development in SSA as well. Through this interest, the U.S. has
established a new independent development institution, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation (MCC), which will oversee new development funds that are allocated
through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). Relying on a competitive selection
processes for recipients to participate in as well as more accountability on recipients
through country-led solutions and implementation, the MCC is providing for a
development aid strategy that prevents previous detrimental aid allocation practices from
occurring. A stronger focus on one of SSA gravest problems, HIV/AIDS, through the
U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is also a sign that the U.S.
is embracing one of the biggest threats to stability in the region (Neilson, 2005).
Testing the effect of the War on Terror will require this study to look at context of
this security environment, specifically the threat from failing states and Islamic terrorism
(Lyman and Morrison. 2004), and how the allocation of foreign aid to SSA can protect
U.S. national security. Seeing whether the U.S. is providing aid to help prevent state
failure as well as deterring terrorist threats from arising will require testing foreign aid

the region. While the U.S. has engaged SSA more directly through some of it counter-terrorism programs,
it is still unknown how the U.S. will react to future crises in the region.
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determinants that measure the risk of failure as well as the SSA states role in the War on
Terror; either as cooperating partners or states at risk of terrorism.
The perspectives on foreign aid allocation each offer a different view into the
most influential factor in determining a donor’s foreign aid allocation. By looking at
whether the U.S. follows its own strategic interest, the development interest of the SSA
states, and if the U.S. is being affected by the specific threat of terrorism in the region,
this study will be able to offer some insight into how the U.S. views foreign aid as well as
its relationship with SSA. The following chapter will explain how these three
perspectives will be tested by breaking down the methodology and operationalization of
the different hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The methodology for this study on the effect of the War on Terror on the U.S.’s
foreign aid allocation on SSA will be a multivariate panel regression that will test several
hypothesized determinants of U.S. foreign aid to SSA before and after the start of the
War on Terror to see if any change in purpose of U.S. aid occurred after the start of this
new security environment. According to the perspectives on foreign aid allocation
described in the previous chapter, the U.S.’s strategic interest towards SSA and the U.S.’s
concern towards the development of the recipient states stand as potential explanations
for the U.S.’s aid allocation to the region. From these two perspectives, several
hypotheses can be derived that explain the different aspects of U.S. foreign aid under
each perspective. Also, this study will include additional hypotheses that are based off of
specific interests connected to the War on Terror to see if this security environment has
had any specific effect on U.S. foreign aid to the region.
Before hypotheses derived from these perspectives can be tested, a discussion of
the methodology is required. The methodology for this study on U.S. foreign aid
allocation will consist of a multivariate panel regression that tests potential determinants
of the actual amount of foreign aid allocated to the SSA states. The study assumes that
specific cases in the data have a higher influential effect on U.S. foreign aid than the rest
of the data. To control for these effects, this study will employ a partial fixed effects
model that will include the most significant cases as dummy variables in each analysis.
These cases will be selected by finding the summed residuals and residual variance ratios
of all the cases and including any case whose summed residuals rated five times higher
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than the mean value of the dependent variable in the analysis. Several allocation studies
have relied on using panel data (Berthe´lemy and Tichit, 2004; Trumball and Wall, 1994;
Collier and Dollar, 2002; Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu, 1998), and the method of using
panel corrected standard errors with fixed effects have been noted for its superiority in
time-series models over other methods (Beck and Katz, 1995; 1996).
The panel analysis for this study consists of the SSA states16 over the time period
of 1992-2008. While this study is testing for the effect of the War on Terror on U.S.
foreign aid allocation, it is important to split the analysis between the start of the War on
Terror (2001). The first period comprises the time period from 1992 to 2000 and the
second comprises the time period from 2002 to 2008. The year 2001 will not be included
in the analysis, as the start of the War on Terror occurred over half way through the year.
Aid allocated during this year cannot be determined to be allocated before or after the
attacks, limiting the ability of seeing a true effect from the War on Terror. Running
separate analyses is important, as any significant change in determinant variables
between the two time periods would show an important effect which the War on Terror
may have on U.S. foreign aid.

16

SAA states included in this study include: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire), Republic
of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau,
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Due to lack of data for some of the states, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Liberia, Sao
Tome & Principe, and Somalia are not included in the analysis. Guinea, Namibia, and Sierra Leone also
suffer from serious missing data problems in the dataset.
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Conceptionalization of Hypotheses and Operationalization of Variables
Reviewing the two perspectives on purpose of foreign aid allocation and the
additional interests connected to the War on Terror, each of these views and interests
contain several aspects in which the U.S. may consider when allocating its foreign aid to
SSA. From these different perspectives and potential interests, several hypotheses may be
derived that each measure separate interests on which the U.S. may focus when deciding
on its foreign aid allocation. While several hypotheses will be discussed in the following
sections, only a selected number of hypotheses from each perspective will be included in
the final analysis in an attempt to keep the model parsimonious. The following sections
will now describe the potential hypotheses and the operationalization of their variables.
Perspective 1: Strategic Interest of the U.S.
According to the strategic interest perspective, the U.S.’s foreign aid allocation is
affected mainly by the interests the U.S. would have towards SSA. As these interests may
comprise of political and economic interests, such as access to new trade markets, access
to natural resources such as oil, cooperation with U.S. foreign policy from the recipient
state, and other benefits which would be potential reciprocates from the allocation of aid,
the hypotheses that are derived from this perspective each must express these interests in
some fashion.
Economic interest hypotheses have been used before, as trade relations between
the U.S. and many SSA states have been established since the end of the Cold War.
Hypotheses which look at the U.S.’s interest in oil from SSA have also been used, as
growing interest within U.S. policymakers towards increasing its reliance of oil from the
region has been noted in the literature (Sebunya, 2001; Volman, 2003; Ndumbe, 2004).
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Other potential economic variables, such as the total amount of foreign direct investment
(FDI) from the U.S. in SSA states, may potentially reveal the amount of interest the U.S.
has in the region.17 Using a trade variable that measures the total amount of trading
(importing and exporting) between the U.S. and the individual SSA states and an oil
exporting variable that shows which states have exported oil to the U.S., this analysis will
be able to test hypotheses pertaining to the economic interest the U.S. would have
towards SSA.18
Though economic hypotheses are relatively easy to conceptualize, strategic
political interest variables are not so easy. Previous studies on U.S. aid allocation have
relied on United Nation Security Council (UNSC) rotating membership votes (Kuziemko
and Werker, 2006), access for military bases (Schraeder, 2006), and ideological
similarities with the U.S. (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor,1998) as interests on which the
U.S. would focus. While studies have relied on these potential hypotheses and variables
before, many of these variables do not fit into this study’s model due to the timeframe in
which the study covers, post-Cold War, as well as the sole regional focus on SSA. It is
difficult to address causality with votes in the UNSC, as it cannot be seen whether the
SSA member states are voting because they are getting aid from the U.S. or they are truly
voting in their own best interest (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). The access to African
military bases in recent years is difficult to use, as the U.S. has access to only one base in
17

A U.S. FDI variable was tested in separate trials. The results produced similar results to the total
U.S. trade variable, so it was decided to be not included in the analysis.
18

There are potential theoretical problems with these two variables. For the trade variable, the
increase of trade between the U.S. and SSA was to act as a supplement and replacement for aid to the
region. Also, oil exporting countries have been found to benefit from the increase in trade the most (Moyo,
2009), potentially creating problems of autocorrelation between the variables.
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SSA, Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, and has found extreme difficulty in establishing a base
for AFRICOM (Bah and Aning, 2008). Measuring ideologies similar to the U.S. is also
futile, as this variable does not resonate in a post-Cold War foreign policy environment.
A strategic political interest that can be included involves the size and support of
the recipient states military. Analysts of U.S. foreign aid allocation have identified
security as being the biggest strategic interest of the U.S. when allocating its foreign aid
(Cronin and Ghani, 2006: 195). The size of a recipient’s armed forces and its military
expenditures as a percentage of its GNP is a security variable that has been used in
allocation studies that focus on aid given out during the Cold War (Schraeder, Hook, and
Taylor, 1998).19 Testing the size of military expenditures in a recipient state supports the
interest for the U.S. of wanting strong military relationships with the recipient. According
to the hypothesis, strong military states would receive larger amounts of aid in an attempt
to maintain a strong military alliance between the U.S. and the recipients. Other studies
have used a similar variable along a power-politics rational, where states with higher
military expenditures are viewed as more stable politically (McKinlay and Little, 1977).20
Hypotheses under this rational suggest the U.S. would wish to maintain stability in
regions by supporting stronger states through foreign aid. Though these types of
hypotheses have been used before in determining foreign aid allocation, its validity in this
model is not very high so its presence in this study’s model cannot be fully justified. In an

19

Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor do not find this variable to be significant for their analysis on U.S.
foreign aid.
20

McKinlay and Little find power capabilities with security connotations, such as military
strength, are critical determinants of the donor’s absoluter commitment, or support, to the recipient states.
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attempt for a parsimonious model, a strategic political variable will not be included in the
analysis.
The strategic interest hypotheses that will to be tested in the analysis include:
H1) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that have stronger
trade relationships with the U.S.
H2) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states which export oil to
the U.S.

These two hypotheses provide the main economic interests in which the U.S. would have
towards SSA. If these hypotheses were found to be correct, then one would expect the
U.S. to base a significant part of its allocation off of how much a recipient state trades
with the U.S. and whether a SSA state exports oil to the U.S. Operationalizing variables
for these hypotheses will require measuring the amount of economic activity of a
recipient state through trade and oil exporting. For the first hypothesis, H1, a Total U.S.
Trade/GDP variable is created that measures the total economic value of trade between
the U.S. and a recipient state, importing and exporting, in constant 2005 US dollars,
represented as a ratio of the total trade compared to recipient’s GDP. This manner of
operationalization will show how important trade with the U.S. is and control for
differences in size of economies between the different SSA states. If this hypothesis is
found to be correct, the results in the analysis should show a positive relationship
between the allocated foreign aid and the trade variable.
The second hypothesis, pertaining to the importance of oil exports the U.S., can
be operationalized in two manners. The first manner of operationalization involves
creating a dummy variable that codes a recipient state that exports oil to the U.S. with a
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value of (1) and a non-exporting recipient as a zero, labeled as Oil Exporting dummy in
the analysis. The second manner of operationalization involves measuring the amount of
oil21 exported to the U.S. by recipient states in a year and creating a natural log of this
amount.22 This variable, labeled as Log of Oil Exports to U.S., will show the difference in
the amount of oil exported and its affect on U.S. foreign aid allocation. For this
hypothesis to be correct, the results from the analysis should show a positive relationship
between the oil variables and the amount of foreign aid allocated.
These variables are reliable and have a high validity in measuring the level of
economic interest the U.S. should have towards the region. The variables in these two
hypotheses may have a problem due to their high level of correlation between trade with
the U.S. and oil exports to the U.S. As these two hypotheses may present methodological
problems when they are both included in the model, only one hypothesis, H1, will be
included in the main model for analysis. The second hypothesis will be included in an
alternative model in the Appendix.
Perspective 2: Development Interest of the SSA states
According to the development interest perspective, the U.S.’s foreign aid
allocation is based on the economic and humanitarian needs of the recipient states. This
perspective also emphasizes the level of economic and political policy soundness within
recipient states in order to insure that economic development really will be fostered
through the allocation of foreign aid. This perspective takes on the idealist viewpoint that

21

Measured in thousands of barrels.

22

A natural log of oil exports is used to limit the influence of extreme values of oil exports from
the different oil exporting states.
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foreign aid should be used to benefit the recipients directly through developing their
societies. Following this perspective, several hypotheses can be conceptualized about
whether the U.S. is influenced by the level of poverty, freedom, and economic openness
within the recipient states.
Finding variables to test development needs and economic and political ratings is
not difficult, as international financial institutions (IFI), such as the World Bank (WB)
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), collect different kinds of data and make
them easily available. The World Development Indicators (WDI), which provides
economic, political, humanitarian, and civil society data, is an excellent source for data
collection for variables under this perspective. Poverty and humanitarian conditions can
be measured as the real GDP per capita of a recipient state. Other variables that measure
specific conditions, such as literacy and daily caloric intake, do exist, but are
unfortunately plagued by missing annual data for SSA.23 Luckily, GDP per capita is
typically highly correlated with these other measures and is available for most SSA states
for the time periods covered. Its customary use in allocation studies speaks for its
reliability and validity as a multipurpose variable (Berthe´lemy and Tichit, 2004;
McKinlay and Little, 1977; Lebovic and Voeten, 2009; Tuman and Ayoub, 2004).
Measures of economic policy and governance are also important variables that the
U.S. has focused on since the end of the Cold War (Van de Walle, 2004: 6). Measures of
democracy and civil liberties can be found through Freedom House’s Freedom in the
World Reports. These annual reports rate the level of political rights and protection of

23

Due to considerable variation of these variables between the panel years of the dataset, mean
substitution to fill in the missing data across the entire time periods is not a suitable option.
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civil liberties within a state on a scale of one to seven, with the measures being inverted
with a score of one representing “free” and a score of seven representing “not free.”
Freedom House’s wide use in studies points to its reliability and validity to the analysis
(Berthe´lemy and Tichit, 2004; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Tuman and Ayoub, 2004).
Besides political ratings, economic ratings are also important to this perspective.
A push for more sound economic policy has been suggested as a potential solution to
SSA’s poor economic conditions (Burnside and Dollar, 2002; Collier and Dollar, 2002).
While economic policy ratings exist through the WDI, they are fairly recent and do not
cover enough years to be effective in this analysis. Instead, a measure of trade as a
percentage of a recipient’s GDP should show how open a recipient’s economic market is,
which may be considered to be a sign of sound economic policy (Moyo, 2009).
Theoretically, a state with a high portion of trade would have a more open and marketfriendly economy.
The hypotheses that can be derived under the development interest perspective
include:
H3) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with higher levels
of economic need.
H4) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with higher levels
of freedom.
H5) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with higher levels
of trade openness.

Each of these hypotheses explains the development interest of the SSA states by showing
the basic premises of the recipients’ needs, level of freedom, and economic openness.
The need hypothesis, H3, explains the U.S. foreign aid as going to states which are
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considered to be worse off economically through the variable GDP per capita. If this
hypothesis were found to be correct, then one would find an inverse relationship between
GDP per capita and the foreign aid allocated to the region.
The next hypothesis, H4, states that the level of freedom determines the amount
of foreign aid a recipient receives, with freer states receiving higher amounts of aid. The
F.H. average score variable is operationalized by using an average score a recipient state
receives from Freedom House’s Political Rights and Civil Liberties surveys. As Freedom
House scores freer states with lower scores, one would expect to find an inverse
relationship between the amount of foreign aid going to SSA states and their Freedom
House score if this hypothesis was found to be correct.
The final hypothesis under this perspective, H5, states that U.S. foreign aid is
determined by the level of openness which SSA states have towards international trade.
The Total Trade/GDP variable is operationalized by taking the total amount of trade of
the recipient as a percentage of the recipient’s GDP. For this hypothesis to be correct,
then one would need to find a positive relationship between foreign aid allocated and the
trade openness variable.
The hypotheses under this perspective accurately test the underlying aspects of
the development interests of the recipient states. Their variables are valid and are reliable
in measuring recipients’ needs, level of freedom, and trade openness. While the trade
openness hypothesis represents an important interest that deserves to be tested in its
effect on U.S. foreign aid, its multicollinearity with the trade hypothesis from the
strategic interest perspective, H1, has the potential to cause methodological problems
within the analysis. To avoid any problems in the analysis, this hypothesis, H5, will not
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be included in the analysis. This hypothesis will be tested in an additional model in the
Appendix.
War on Terror Hypotheses
As this study focuses on the effect of the War on Terror, additional hypotheses
which are based around specific interests for the U.S. in the War on Terror need to be
tested. As the U.S. would wish to prevent the rise of global terrorist threats from
emerging in SSA, its foreign aid may be allocated around specific interests connected to
the threat of terrorism. These interests include the level of stability within a recipient
state, previous terrorist attacks in recipient states, any cooperation between recipient
states and the U.S.’s counterterrorism operations, and the size of Muslim populations
within recipients that are susceptible to supporting terrorist movements. As the threat
from international terrorism, with a special focus on Islamic terrorism, has dictated U.S.
foreign policy since the 9/11 attacks (Dollar, 2008), one should expect this influence to
spread to U.S.’s foreign aid allocation decisions. Looking at the period of 2001 through
2008, any significant findings of the hypotheses derived from this perspective will reveal
any important impact which the War on Terror has on U.S. foreign aid.
The hypotheses that can be tested under this perspective include:
H6: The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that are at risk of
failing.
H7: The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that have been
experienced terrorist attacks.
H8: The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states which have
cooperated with the U.S.’s counterterrorism operations.
H9: The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with large Muslim
populations.
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Each of these hypotheses represents an important interest which the U.S. may focus on in
its foreign aid allocation during the War on Terror.
The first hypothesis, H6, represents the biggest threat the U.S. views from the
region in regards to the spread of terrorism (U.S. National Security Strategy, 2002). The
threat of failed and failing states has brought much attention to national security experts,
and measuring how foreign aid has been impacted by this threat is important to show the
effect the War on Terror has had on the U.S.’s foreign aid allocation. Measuring whether
a state can be considered to be failing or failed is a difficult task. Some scholars prefer to
use the capability of state’s governments in providing basic services (Rotberg, 2004),
while others rely on a violent disruption in the political stability of a state (PITF, 2010).
Neither of these types of measurement accurately portrays state failure completely
(Howard, 2010), which questions the validity and reliability of any variable that would be
used to measure the level of instability.
The measures from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) datasets (Marshall
et al, 2009) do appear to present a more valid and reliable measure of instability. The fact
the PITF is funded by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indicates its validity, as the
U.S. government is relying on these measures in its own intelligence analyses. The PITF
measures instability in a state by recording whether a state experiences a revolutionary
war, an ethnic war, an adverse or disruptive regime transition, or genocides and /or
politicides during a given year.24 Using the data from the PITF’s annual datasets, the
State Failure dummy variable is operationalized by coding a recipient state that has

24

The PITF datasets list whether a state experiences a political disruption as a one in the year
which the disruption occurred. The PITF datasets do not list years in which no instability event occurred.
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experienced one of these political disruptions in given year as a (1). Any SSA state that
did not experience one of these disruptions in a given year would be coded as a zero. If
this hypothesis was proven to be correct, then one would expect to find a positive
relationship between the state instability dummy variable and the allocated foreign aid.
The second hypothesis, H7, looks at the direct experience which recipient states
have had with terrorist attacks. Measuring the number of terrorist attacks which have
occurred within a recipient state is an important indicator of the level of threat of
terrorism is within the region.25 The Num. of Terrorist Attacks variable is operationalized
by a simple count of the number of terrorist attacks inside a recipient state during the
selected years, recorded in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). For this hypothesis to
be correct, one would expect to find a positive relationship between the number of attacks
and foreign aid that has been allocated.
The third hypothesis, H8, looks at the cooperation which the SSA states have with
any of the U.S.’s counterterrorism operations in the region. Since the beginning of the
War on Terror, the U.S. has started several regional security programs to build up the
capacity of the SSA states to combat against terrorist threats. These regional programs
include the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,
Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (TSCPT), the Combined Joint Task ForceHorn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), and other counterterrorism programs. 26 The

25

An additional variable, measuring the number of casualties from terrorist expressed as a ratio
per 100,000 individuals of a recipient’s population was tested in separate trials. Results produced were
insignificant, and not included in the final model.
26

States which were part of the “Coalition of the Willing” in the Iraq War were also included in
this variable.
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operationalization of the Cooperation with U.S. Counterterrorism dummy variable for
this hypothesis consists of developing a dummy variable that codes a recipient state’s
cooperation with any of these operations as a (1), zero otherwise. Taking part in the
U.S.’s security operations would appear to create good standing between a recipient and
the U.S., and rewarding this cooperation with higher amounts of foreign aid may be a
reasonable notion for the U.S. This line of thinking shows the validity of the variable
being tested in this hypothesis. For this hypothesis to be correct, one should see a positive
relationship between the cooperation dummy variable and the allocated foreign aid.
The final hypothesis, H9, asserts that the size of the Muslim population within a
SSA state affects the amount of foreign aid being allocated to the state, with recipient
states with large Muslim populations receiving larger amounts of foreign aid.27 This
hypothesis is an explicit reference towards the focus on Islamic terrorism by the U.S.,
rather than general terrorist groups. The giving of extra foreign aid to states with large
Muslim populations can have several rationalizations. First, the U.S. may want to win
support from Muslim communities through aid to increase its soft power against the
threat of terrorism (Radlet, 2003; Nye, 2003). Second, the U.S. may want to provide more
aid to these states with large Muslim populations to help these states’ governments build
up their capacity in handling potential Islamic terrorist threats that may emerge. Some
recent studies have relied on this variable in testing U.S. foreign aid allocation during the
War on Terror (Moss, Roodman, and Standley, 2005), providing some validity towards

27

The Muslim population variable has no threshold to constitute a large size population. The
measure is a simple percentage of the Muslim population within each recipient state.
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its use.28 The operationalization of the %Muslim variable for this hypothesis is the size of
a recipient state’s Muslim population as a percentage of its total population. If this
hypothesis is proven to be valid, one would expect to see a positive relationship between
the size of the Muslim population and the amount of foreign aid allocated.
Each of these hypothesis provide important insight into the potential threat of
terrorism the U.S. views to be in SSA and how the U.S. may allocate foreign aid in an
attempt to contain this threat. While the validity of these variables may be strong, their
inclusion in the model together may create potential methodological problems. To avoid
problems of multicollinearity, and to keep to a more parsimonious model, this study will
rely on only the state failure hypothesis, H6, in the final model. The other hypotheses will
be included as additional models presented in the Appendix.

Final Model of Analysis on U.S. Foreign Aid Allocation to SSA
The final model of analysis for this study on U.S. foreign aid allocation to SSA
will test the following hypotheses:
H1) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that have stronger
trade relationships with the U.S.
H3) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with greater
economic needs.
H4) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states with higher levels
of freedom.

28

Moss only finds significance with this variable when measuring all of the U.S. foreign aid
allocation and not controlling for aid going to Iraq and Afghanistan. Moss does test SSA separately, but
does not include this variable. Fleck and Kilby (2008) discuss the use of a Muslim population variable, but
do not find any significant findings.
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H6) The U.S. provides more foreign aid to SSA states that are at risk of
failing.

These four hypotheses provide a strong representation of the three perspectives on U.S.
foreign aid. To control for the effect in which previous allocation amounts have in
determining foreign aid amounts and to control for autocorrelation in the model, this
model will also include a lagged dependent variable, labeled as ODA/GDP_lagged one
year, as one of the independent variables.29
To test each of these hypotheses, each of their corresponding variables will be
tested for significance in determining the dependent variable of U.S. foreign aid to the
SSA states (referred to as ODA/GDP in the analysis). This dependent variable consists of
the total amount of net disbursements30 from official development assistance the U.S. has
allocated to a recipient SSA state in a given year. To control for the differences in
population and geography, the dependent variable is shown as a ratio of foreign aid to a
recipient’s annual GDP. To show causality of the independent variables in determining
the dependent variable, it is important to lag each independent variable by one year
(Feeny and McGillivray, 2002). It is also important to control for inflation. To do this, the
U.S. net disbursements have been adjusted by the U.S.’s consumer price index (CPI)
(2005 constant dollars) (Dollar and Alesina, 2000). All other economic variables,
including the recipients’ GDP in the dependent variable, have been adjusted by each of
the recipients’ own CPI (2005 constant dollars).

29

Each additional hypothesis will be run in separate analyses, with each hypothesis replacing only
one of the primary hypotheses listed above with the other primary hypotheses remaining in the model.
30

Recorded in USD millions (constant dollars 2005=1).
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Tables 3 and 4 show the summary statistics of the variables included in the
primary model as well as a correlation matrix. These statistics are split between the two
separate time periods.31 The following chapter will now present the results of the panel
analyses from the models presented above. Running the analyses on the two separate time
periods, one can clearly see a change in purpose of U.S. foreign aid to SSA after the start
of the War on Terror. The start of this security environment also showed the U.S. having
a specific focus on certain interest in the War on Terror. This focus has been limited to
the threat of failing states though, and not other specific interests under the War on
Terror.

Table 3

31

Note, the mean value for the dependent variable in the first period, 1992-2000, is extremely
high. While this value should be less than 1.0, certain SSA states which suffered from high levels of
inflation during this period have inflated the mean value of the dependent variable. A separate trial which
excluded these high inflation states produced similar results to the analysis with these states included.
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Table 4
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CHAPTER4
FINDINGS
The results of the analyses shall tell us whether the War on Terror has or has not
had an effect on U.S. foreign aid allocation to SSA by showing us any changes in the
selected variables between the two models before and after the start of the War on Terror.
These results will also aid our attempt in trying to explain U.S. foreign aid allocation
around the perspectives of foreign aid either being allocated to serve the strategic interest
of the U.S. or the development interests of the recipient states. In regards to the
applicability of these perspectives, our findings indicate that the U.S. has not followed its
own strategic interest based around the economic interest variables during both time
periods. These results indicate SSA does not hold strategic economic interest to the U.S.
at this time. The findings also indicate that the U.S.’s focus on the development interests
of the recipients is not a complete explanation of U.S. foreign aid to SSA, as the
regression analyses produced mixed results in regards to the economic need variable and
the political and economic capability variables. While the economic need variable
appears to have an effect on U.S. aid, other development variables measuring good
economic and political policies did not turn out. This would suggest that while the U.S.
has been at times focused on the level of development need in SSA, it has not been
concerned with how capable the recipient states are in using the aid efficiently.
With respect to the effect of the War on Terror on foreign aid, our findings show
several changes in U.S. foreign aid allocation to the region after the start of this new
international security environment. A difference between significant allocation trends
with states at risk of failure can be clearly seen between the two time periods. This
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observation can be confirmed with two separate variables that measure instability. Other
variables tied to the War on Terror either did not come out as significant indicators or did
not change between the two time periods. These results would suggest a limited effect the
threat of terrorism in SSA has on U.S. foreign aid to the region. The results of the
primary models for this study are listed in Table 5, with alternative models with the
additional variables presented in Table 6 with their complete results listed in the
Appendix.32 The findings from these models will be discussed in detail below.

Table 5

32

The partial fixed effects models for both time periods includes dummy variables for SSA states
that were perceived to have a high amount of influence on the model. The regression analysis for the first
time period includes dummy variables for Angola, Burundi, Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, and Uganda. The second time period includes dummy
variables for Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Sudan. The coefficients,
standard errors, and significance levels for the state dummy variables can be found in the complete models
listed in the appendix.
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Results of U.S. Foreign Aid to Sub-Saharan Arica before the War on Terror
The regression results from the model consisting of the period before the start of
the War on Terror, 1992-2000, present an interesting picture of how U.S. foreign aid was
allocated to SSA after the end of the Cold War. The results of this model indicate that the
U.S. did not follow its economic interest, providing less aid on average to SSA states that
engaged in trade with the U.S. The SSA states’ development interests do not appear to
offer a clear explanation of U.S. foreign aid to region either, as the desired economic and
political indicators did not produce the hypothesized results. Instead, the results indicate
that the U.S. focused on providing more aid on average to relatively better-off states
compared to the poorest states in the region. The expected results of the U.S. not focusing
on states at risk of failing were also confirmed in the model. A more in depth discussion
of the results of the variables is provided below.

Table 6
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The U.S.’s Strategic Interest
According to the hypotheses under the U.S.’s strategic interest perspective, the
U.S. should provide more foreign aid on average to SSA states that offered some kind of
strategic economic interest. The variable that was relied on in the primary models to test
the actuality of this perspective is the Total U.S. Trade/GDP variable. For this variable’s
hypothesis to be accepted, one would need to see a significant positive result from the
regression analysis. The coefficient for U.S. Trade/GDP is negative and significant at the
.05 level. This result suggests that the U.S. provided less aid on average to SSA states
which engaged in high levels of trade with the U.S. These results are not surprising, as
increased trade with the region has been considered to act as an alternative to aid to the
region (AGOA, 2009).
Other strategic interest variables that were run in separate regression analyses also
show a similar relationship with foreign aid. The coefficients for the Oil Exporting
dummy variable and the Log of Oil Exports to the U.S. variable both produced significant
results with negative values. These results show that the U.S. provided less foreign aid on
average to states which exported oil to the U.S. These results also indicate that the U.S.
was not using its foreign aid to help develop potential oil resources on a major scale. It
will be necessary to compare these findings with the findings from the models after the
start of the War on Terror to see if the U.S.’s insecurity about the Middle East affected its
level of focus on African oil. From these results, however, one must reject the individual
hypotheses for the strategic interest variables during this period as well as reject the
strategic interest perspective in explaining U.S. foreign aid to SSA before the start of the
War on Terror. The results from all of the strategic interest perspective are not consistent
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with this perspective on foreign aid. These results are more consistent with humanitarian
views on the purpose of foreign aid though.
The Development Interests of the SSA States
According to the development interest perspective explaining U.S. foreign aid
allocation, the U.S. is to allocate aid to the SSA states based around their need for
development as well as their capability for using such aid efficiently. The results from
this first model indicate that the U.S. was not influenced heavily by the determinants of
the recipients’ development interests during this time period. The variables that were
included in the primary models for this perspective are the GDP per capita variable,
measuring economic and development need, and the Freedom House average score
variable, measuring the level of democracy and the protection of human rights. The
results for these two variables indicate a wrong type of relationship in regards to the
recipients’ need and no significant relationship between U.S. foreign aid allocation and a
concern for democracy and human rights.
If the development need hypothesis is to be accepted, one would expect to see the
U.S. providing more aid to SSA states with lower GDP per capita values. As the
coefficient for this variable received a positive score with significance at the .05 level, it
can clearly be seen that the U.S. followed the exact opposite path during this time
period.33 While the development need hypothesis that was presented must be rejected in
this model, these particular results do not invalidate the development interest perspective.
Since this analysis only focuses on SSA, no states included in the analysis can be viewed
33

An alternative variable measuring real GDP per capita squared was tested in a separate analysis
to test for non-linearity in the GDP per capita variable. The results from the GDP per capita squared
variable were non-significant and not included in the final model.
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as not needing development assistance. The results from this variable may have to do
with the U.S. not wanting to allocate its foreign aid to weak and instable states which
would most likely waste the aid away through corruption.
The other variables measuring the capability of using foreign aid efficiently
should have matched up with the GDP per capita findings if our explanation of the GDP
variable is accurate. The Freedom House variable, which hypothesizes that democratic
states which protect human rights would use aid more efficiently and receive more
foreign aid on average, has produced positive results with no significance. One would
need to see negative results with significance if the hypothesis is to be accepted.34 This
study must reject this variable’s hypothesis, as the Freedom House’s scores had no
influence on U.S. foreign aid allocation during this time. An explanation for these results
may be simply that the U.S. is not concerned with how recipient states are governed or
the amount of freedom once other influences in the model have been taken into account.
This explanation would go against the stated desires of U.S. policymakers (Korb, 2008),
but matches similar findings on U.S. aid allocation (Neumayer, 2003; Lebovic and
Voeten, 2009).35
The final variable measuring the capability of recipient states to use foreign aid
efficiently was the Total Trade/GDP variable. This variable, measuring how open a
recipient state is to foreign trade and the soundness of its economic policy, produced
34

Again, Freedom House scores are inverted with more democratic states with higher civil
liberties receiving lower scores.
35

The SSA state dummy variables included the partial fixed effects model may have an effect on
this variable. A panel regression model that includes no state dummy variables (not included in this study)
produced significant results with negative values. A full fixed effects model (also not included) produced
non-significant results with a negative value.
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similar results compared to the other trade variables found under the strategic interest
perspective. The negative significant results for this variable cause one to reject the
hypothesis that the U.S. would provide more aid on average to states with more open
economies and sound economic policies. Its negative results, along with the other trade
variables, may indicate that international trade in SSA was little priority for the U.S.
during this time period. Its wrongly hypothesized results, along with the results of the
other development interest variables, also cause one to question the applicability of the
recipients’ development interest as a major influence on U.S. foreign aid allocation
before the start of the War on Terror.
Pre-Effect of the War on Terror
In order to see a more direct effect of the War on Terror on U.S. foreign aid, one
must first see how variables specifically tied to the threat of international terrorism
influenced U.S. aid to SSA before the start of the War on Terror. The coefficient for the
State Failure dummy variable, measuring the presence of political instability within a
recipient state, received negative significant results, indicating the U.S. was not providing
more aid on average to states at risk of failure. These results may give life to the
development interest perspective, as the U.S. may have not wanted to allocate money to
an unstable country. The results for the coefficient for the GDP per capita variable’s
results matchup with the State Failure variable’s results, as they both indicate the U.S. did
not provide more foreign aid on average to states that experienced high political and
economic instability. This confirms that the U.S. had no interest in failing states before
the start of the War on Terror. If the War on Terror is to have an actual effect on U.S.
foreign aid, one should expect to see these two results to be reversed in the next model.
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Other variables tied to the War on Terror also produced the expected results of not
having any positive influence on U.S. foreign aid during this time. The Muslim
population coefficient received negative significant results, indicating that the U.S. on
average allocated more money to SSA states with smaller Muslim populations. The
Number of Terrorist Attacks variable did not receive significance in the model, indicating
that it was not a major focus of the U.S.36 As with the State Failure variable and GDP per
capita variable, this study expects these results to change in the model if the War on
Terror had an overarching effect on U.S. foreign aid.
The most telling variable results from this first model can be clearly seen as the
lagged dependent variable of ODA/GDP. This variable received the highest significance,
at the .001 level, indicating the previous year’s allocation amount affects the next year’s
amount. The adjusted R2 value of .96 provides even greater evidence of this determinant’s
influence, as its inclusion allows the model to explain nearly 100% of U.S. foreign aid
allocation to SSA from 1992-2000. These results are not particularly surprising, as many
have found the best predictor of any government allocated budget to be the previous
year’s amount allocated (Griffin and Enos, 1970: 315).

Results of U.S. Foreign Aid to SSA after the Start of the War on Terror
The findings from the second model, consisting of the years 2002-2008, show
interesting results in respect to the U.S.’s changing priorities towards SSA during the
War on Terror. As the War on Terror is assumed to have such a major impact on U.S.

36

These results are interesting though, as some of the biggest terrorist attacks conducted against
the U.S. abroad occurred in SSA during this time period.
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foreign policy, this study hypothesizes that any significant changes in U.S. foreign aid
allocation practices after 2001 are the result of the War on Terror influencing U.S.
foreign aid. The most significant changes in U.S. foreign aid to the region can be seen
with more aid on average being allocated to states which are at risk of failing. This
change can be seen in the State Failure variable and the GDP per capita variable. Other
changes include significant results for the Freedom House variable, yet in the wrong
direction, and the lack of influence from the lagged dependent variable on the model. The
other variables tied to the effect of the War on Terror hypothesis did not turnout,
suggesting a limited effect of the War on Terror. Going through the perspectives once
more in this new time period, one shall see if the purpose of U.S. foreign aid changed
after the start of the War on Terror.
The U.S.’s Strategic Interest
The variables under the strategic interest perspective did not change from their
results in the earlier model. The coefficient for the Total U.S. Trade/GDP remained
significant, at a higher level than the previous model, and remained negative. Again, the
U.S. is providing more aid on average to states that did not take part in a lot of trade with
the U.S. The oil variables also remained significant, but with lower levels, and were
negative as well. These results and the results from the previous period indicate that the
U.S.’s strategic interest has not had an influential effect on U.S. foreign aid to SSA. The
start of the War on Terror has not had an effect on the U.S.’s economic focus towards
SSA, as the U.S. is not looking towards what it can gain from SSA through the allocation
of its foreign aid.
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The Development Interest of the SSA States
The variables measuring the development interest of the recipient states present
some interesting results in the second model. The coefficient for the GDP per capita
variable remained significant, but changed its direction. During this timeframe under the
War on Terror, the U.S. provided more aid on average to states that had a greater
economic and development need. This drastic change in focus by the U.S. may be
understood as an effect of the War on Terror, causing U.S. policymakers to focus on
states with the worst economic conditions in the hope of preventing these states from
failing and falling into chaos.
The variables measuring the recipients’ capability of using aid efficiently received
some interesting results from the analysis. As the coefficient for the Total Trade/GDP
variable did not drastically change, though it did increase in significance, this study can
reject the notion that the U.S. focuses on sound economic policies of the recipients when
allocating foreign aid to the region. The Freedom House score variable produced an
interesting result, as this variable received a positive score with significance at the .1
level. These results indicate that the U.S. provided more foreign aid on average to states
that were less democratic and violated the human rights of their citizens. These results
again go against the hypothesis that the U.S. focused on democracy and protecting human
rights with its foreign aid. These findings may be tied to the new focus on state failure
and instability, as the majority of states which experienced some form of instability have
poor Freedom House scores.37

37

Only two states with Freedom House ratings of “free” were recorded to experience instability in
the State Failure variable (South Africa and Mali).
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Reviewing the results from all of the variables under the development interest
perspective, this perspective can be accepted as explaining U.S. foreign aid allocation to
SSA based around the premise of the U.S. providing its foreign aid to the neediest SSA
states. This acceptance is supported by the results of the GDP per capita variable. This
perspective cannot be accepted based around the premise of the U.S. providing its foreign
aid to states that have the best political and economic policies to use the aid efficiently.
The negative results of the Total Trade/GDP variable and the focus on undemocratic
states in the U.S.’s aid allocation forces one to reject this part of the perspective.
Post-Effect of the War on Terror
The variables tied to the War on Terror show some significant changes in their
results compared to the previous model. The most significant changes can be seen in the
State Failure variable. The coefficient for this variable received the highest level of
significance and is positive. These results indicate that the U.S. provided more aid on
average to states which experienced some form of a political instability, opposite of the
previous model focusing on before the War on Terror. These results suggest that the War
on Terror has had an effect on U.S. foreign aid, as the need to prevent states from failing
by ensuring their development was identified as one of the pillars of U.S. national
security under the War on Terror (U.S. National Security Strategy, 2002).
The other variables tied to the War on Terror did not change in their results from
the previous model. The coefficient for the Muslim population variable remained
negative, indicating that the U.S. provided less aid on average to states with large Muslim
populations. This result goes against the belief that the U.S. would allocate its foreign aid
in an attempt to increase its soft power and image in the Muslim world. As it does not
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make sense that the U.S. would intentionally provide less aid to larger Muslim
populations, other explanations probably exist to explain these results. A likely
explanation for this result is that many of the Muslim-majority countries, such as
Senegal, Mali, Chad and Niger, are former French colonies and in France’s sphere of
influence.38
The coefficient for the Number of Terrorist Attacks variable is not significant in
this model, indicating no change from the previous time period. These results may tell us
that the U.S. does not view terrorism within SSA as much as a threat as it views terrorism
in other regions, such as the Middle East. The U.S. may also focus on dealing with this
kind of threat through its military assistance rather than its development assistance.
Improving SSA states’ counterterrorism capability through military assistance is highly
plausible and deserves further investigation to see if terrorism has an effect on this form
of aid. Another variable tied to regional security is the Cooperation with U.S.
Counterterrorism variable. This variable also produced non-significant results, indicating
that the U.S. did not provide more foreign aid as a reward to the states that took part in
these counterterrorism operations. As some of these programs were tied to military
training, these states may have had an increase in the amount of military assistance
allocated to them.
A final change that can be seen between the results of the two models is the loss
of significance for the lagged dependent variable in the period after the start of the War
on Terror. As this variable earned the highest level of significance in the first model, its
38

Another plausible explanation of this pattern of U.S. aid allocation is the fact that many SSA
states with large Muslim populations are not included in the analysis due to missing data. These include
Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.
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non-significant status in the second model indicates that the U.S. did not follow previous
years’ foreign aid allocations in determining aid levels. The much smaller adjusted R2 for
this model reveals this missing influence. If the U.S. has not been following previous
years’ foreign aid allocation amounts, then foreign aid to the SSA states would have
varied greatly year to year for an unknown reason. These results beg the question even
more of what actually influences U.S. foreign aid allocation to SSA during the War on
Terror.
Reviewing the results of the different variables in the model covering the period
of 2002-2008, one can clearly see the effect that the War on Terror has had on U.S.
foreign aid allocation to SSA. As the U.S. has shifted its focus to states at risk of failing
and provided more aid to the neediest states, there is evidence that the War on Terror has
influenced U.S. foreign aid in a profound manner.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The results of our analysis presented some interesting explanations of U.S.
foreign aid to SSA. Reviewing the differences between the two time periods, one can
clearly see a change in focus for the U.S. in regards to states at risk of failure after the
start of the War on Terror. This fact can be seen with the U.S. providing more aid on
average to states with lower economic wealth as well as to states that have experienced
some form of political instability. The results provide mixed support for the perspectives
that have been used to explain U.S. foreign aid. The results do not show any evidence
that U.S. economic interests or the development interests of the SSA states influenced US
foreign aid levels across the entire time period. The lack of concern the U.S. has shown
about the recipients’ political and economic capability to use foreign aid efficiently also
causes us to question if the U.S. is truly motivated by the development interests of the
recipient states. The fact that a change in focus for the U.S. occurred between the start of
the War on Terror does not prove the War on Terror actually had an effect on U.S.
foreign aid to the region either, as other potential explanations may exist. This concluding
chapter will review the results of this analysis and look at the possible implications which
these findings may have for U.S. foreign aid to SSA. Other explanations of the results
will also be reviewed to assess if the War on Terror has had an actual effect on U.S.
foreign aid.
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Implications of the Findings on U.S. Foreign Aid to SSA
The findings on the determinants of U.S. foreign aid to SSA before and after the
start of the War on Terror tell us many things about that on which the U.S. has and has
not focused on when considering its aid allocation towards the region. The results of the
analysis reveal much about the actual purposes of U.S. foreign aid as well as the U.S.’s
foreign policy towards SSA. This study can find no evidence that the U.S., before the
start of the War on Terror, provided foreign aid on the basis of advancing U.S. economic
interests in the region. The results show that the relationships between the oil and trade
variables and foreign aid levels are just the opposite of those hypothesized. These results
remain the same in the period after the start of the War on Terror. With both sets of
results, one cannot accept the argument that the U.S.’s economic interests influence its
foreign aid to the region.
While the U.S.’s economic interests do not appear to have a positive impact on
aid levels to SSA countries, one cannot all together reject the strategic interest
perspective as an explanation of U.S. foreign aid. Because this study did not include a
strategic political variable in the model, one cannot know if the U.S. bases its foreign aid
on specific political interests it may have towards SSA. U.S. political interest variables
for SSA are not easily conceptualized. While political interest has been easier
conceptualized during periods such as the Cold War, with variables measuring such
things as alliances, the post-Cold War period does not offer many visible interests the
U.S. would have towards SSA. Some studies have relied on the level of military
assistance given to a SSA state from the U.S. an indicator of the level of U.S. interest in a
state (Kilby and Fleck, 2008). The validity of this variable is questionable though. While
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SSA has been viewed to not have a strategic value towards the U.S. in the past
(Kraxberger, 2005; Schraeder, 2006), the U.S. may reevaluate its view of SSA in the
coming years as the threat of international terrorism continues. This reevaluation may
also be the result of the U.S.’s unease with China’s growing level of influence in the
region.
Based on the analysis, the variables associated with the development interest
perspective do not go very far in explaining the U.S.’s aid allocation to SSA. While the
coefficient for the economic need variable is negative and significant in the period after
the start of the War on Terror, as hypothesized, it is positive and significant in the
previous time period. Moreover, the results reveal that the level of democracy as
measured by Freedom House and trade openness do not have the hypothesized
relationships with aid levels. The GDP per capita variable performs as expected in the
analysis, but these results may be explained by the U.S.’s concern about potential state
failure in the region. This concern is probably driven more by the U.S.’s strategic interest
to ensure its own national security by preventing terrorism than the development interest
of the recipients. Trade openness may also fail to influence aid levels due to the small
role that the SSA states play in the international trade market. As SSA becomes more
involved in the international markets, this interest may change in the coming years.
The findings concerning the level of democracy as measured by Freedom House
have important implications. The U.S.’s lack of concern with democracy and human
rights is contrary to the U.S.’s own foreign aid policies and national security interests.
While the period before the War on Terror shows no pattern between aid allocation and
the level of freedom in the recipient states, the second period shows a pattern of more aid
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going to nondemocratic states with high levels of human rights violations. These
particular results are especially problematic, as encouraging the spread of democracy in
the world became one of the pillars of U.S. national security in 2006 (U.S. National
Security Strategy, 2006).39 This disregard for democracy and human rights creates the
appearance of U.S. hypocrisy. These results do have some logic behind them though. As
failing states tend to be less democratic than more stable states, one should not be
surprised to find the U.S. overlooking democracy with their main focus on instability in
the region.
The most important finding of this study is the observed changes in the
determinants of foreign aid allocation to SSA countries after the start of the War on
Terror. There are good reasons to attribute these changes to the U.S.’s focus in the War
on Terror on the threat of global terrorism in failed states. The emphasis on providing
more aid on average to the poorest states as well as providing more aid to states which
experienced some form of political instability match the change of focus in U.S. national
security towards failing states in 2002. These results provide support for the assertion that
the U.S. followed its national security policy directives by providing more aid to states at
risk of failing. The other variables tied to the War on Terror did not perform as
hypothesized, indicating the limited effect of the War on Terror on U.S. foreign aid. As
the U.S.’s struggle against terrorism in the region is based around both development and
security, one may speculate that the U.S. may base its military assistance to SSA around
these other variables and this study advocates further investigation of the issue.
39

Democracy actually replaced development as a pillar of U.S. national security in 2006 after
development’s founding as one of the three pillars of security in 2002. This change towards a focus on
democracy may be the result of the U.S. justifying the continuing of its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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The biggest implication of the potential effect of the War on Terror on U.S.
foreign aid may be the chaos which it has caused in fueling the transformation of U.S. aid
during this period (Lancaster, 2008). After the start of the War on Terror and the
reevaluation of foreign aid as a tool to fight the threat of terrorism, the Bush
administration initiated the reorganization of the U.S.’s foreign aid institutions in the
attempt to promote more effective development. This reorganization can be seen with the
placing of USAID under the control of the State Department and the establishment of
independent development organizations, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
While the intention of the Bush administration may have been to produce more
development, its actions have left the U.S.’s aid structure in a disorganized state with
many policy questions still to be answered.
Our findings may reflect some of this chaos, as the lagged dependent variable,
representing the previous amount of foreign aid given to a recipient, lost its significance
as an indicator of U.S. aid in period after the start of the War on Terror. See the table
provided in Appendix 3. As the table in the Appendix shows, the percent of change in the
amount of aid allocated to the SSA states from year to year jumped sporadically with
many of the SSA states. Some examples include: Guinea-Bissau’s aid levels dropping
significantly from 2003-2004, then increasing to over 1,000% of the previous year’s
amount allocated in 2005; Central African Republic’s aid level increasing over 3,700% of
the previous year’s amount allocated in 2004; and São Tomé and Príncipe’s aid level
increased over 3,000% of the previous year’s amount allocated in 2004.40
40

There are potential explanations for these specific cases. In 2003, Guinea-Bissau and Central
African Republic both experienced a coup. The significant drop in aid at this time may have been used to
serve as a punishment towards the new regimes. The reestablishment of elections in both states coincides
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As the previous amount of aid was not used as at least a starting basis for each
year’s aid levels, these aid levels are varying wildly year to year. This high level of
variation between years may indicate the U.S. is relying on multiple indicators, the
majority unknown to this study, when determining aid allocation levels. This may point
to the lack of a universal equation for the U.S. to go by to determine foreign aid levels.
As this study has no data to validate this claim, it is recommended for further study of
this issue.
Other Potential Explanations of Changes in U.S. Foreign Aid to SSA
While this study has assumed the changes in U.S. foreign aid allocation to SSA
between the time periods 1992-2000 and 2002-2008 have been the result of the War on
Terror influencing U.S. aid practices, other potential explanations may exist for this
change. The most obvious of these potential alternative explanations is the differences
between the two administrations which held power during these time periods. With
President Clinton in office during the first time period and President Bush in office
during the second time period, these two administrations policies towards the use of
foreign aid and SSA may offer better explanations to the change in focus than the effect
of the War on Terror. These two Presidents have been described as holding different
views towards international relations, with Clinton being described as an idealist and
Bush as a realist (Schrader, 2006), indicating that the U.S. would provide aid based on
the development interest of the recipients during the first time period and based on its
strategic interest during the second period. Our findings do not support these
with the increase of aid. São Tomé and Príncipe did not suffer from any type of state failure during its large
aid increase. The state does have a developing oil industry though, which the U.S. may wish to take
advantage of.
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expectations. In fact, the findings are nearly the opposite of what one would expect had
Clinton been pursuing an idealist agenda and Bush a realist agenda.
The change in aid allocation may also be the result of these different
administrations holding on to a specific level of interest towards the region. While
Clinton presented some early attention to SSA and promised to help with development
during SSA’s “renaissance” (French, 1998), the Clinton administration eventually
showed little action towards the region (Tucker, 1999). President Bush, on the other
hand, has been described as focusing on SSA and its development, based off of his
religious views and a sense of moral duty (Associated Press, 2008).
Another alternative explanation for the change in U.S. aid allocation to SSA may
be the renewed international focus on SSA’s lack of development from celebrities and
politicians. From Bono to Tony Blair, more individuals have focused on the problems of
SSA since the start of the millennium. The U.S.’s new effort against HIV/AIDS in the
region may be explained by this new phenomenon, as the focus on the disease has been
part of an international effort to reduce the amount of damage which the AIDS has had on
the region.

Going Forward
The alternative explanations described above may provide some insight into
changes in U.S. aid allocation after 2001, but the focus on failing states in the U.S.’s
national security policy during the War on Terror and the corresponding aid allocation
pattern during this period should not be ignored. Many questions remain unanswered
regarding the War on Terror’s effect on U.S. aid. If the War on Terror has affected U.S.
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foreign aid, how long will the focus on failing states remain for the U.S.? Will the War on
Terror turn into the new Cold War, and if so, will Cold War tendencies for foreign aid
allocation to the region be repeated? Will the U.S. continue to focus much of its aid
budget on SSA, or will other regions take on more importance for U.S. aid allocation?
How will the Obama administration apply foreign aid to the region? As the U.S. is facing
future budget restraints due to its growing deficit, how will foreign aid be affected if
budgets are cut?
As the answers to these questions remain unknown, study of the U.S.’s foreign aid
practices must continue. Important studies on how U.S. foreign aid has been affected by
the War on Terror must be undertaken, as well as studies on whether the U.S. is actually
preventing states from failing through its foreign aid.
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APPENDIX 1
DATA
Summary Statistics of all Variables
Summary Statistics of Variables 1992-2000
N

Mean

Standard. Deviation

ODA/GDP

333

1883.64

25267.94

Total U.S. Trade/GDP

346

0.06

0.10

GDP per capita

346

561.57

1053.08

F.H. average score

430

4.63

1.61

State Failure dummy

432

0.29

0.45

ODA/GDP_lagged one year

331

65395.98

1114729

Oil Exporting dummy

384

0.18

0.38

Log of Oil Exports to U.S.

432

1.34

3.28

Total Trade/GDP

405

70.62

38.30

%Muslim

432

30.89

34.18

Num. of Terrorist Attacks

385

5.82

19.75

Summary Statistics of Variables 2002-2008
N

Mean

Standard. Deviation

ODA/GDP

280

0.01

0.02

Total U.S. Trade/GDP

279

0.07

0.11

GDP per capita

279

1496.64

2644.19

F.H. average score

336

4.22

1.59

State Failure dummy

336

0.16

0.37

ODA/GDP_lagged one year

278

0.01

0.03

Oil Exporting dummy

336

0.24

0.43

Log of Oil Exports to U.S.

336

1.18

3.12

Total Trade/GDP

315

80.68

40.95

%Muslim

336

30.89

34.19

Num. of Terrorist Attacks

336

2.36

10.3

Cooperation with U.S. Counterterrorism dummy

336

0.26

0.44

78

79

Total U.S. Trade/GDP
-.17**

Num. of Terrorist Attacks
*=significant .10; **=.05; ***=.001

%Muslim

Total Trade/GDP

Log of Oil Exports to U.S.

Oil Exporting dummy

ODA/GDP_lagged one year

State Failure dummy

F.H. average score

GDP per capita

Total U.S. Trade/GDP

ODA/GDP

%Muslim

Total Trade/GDP

Log of Oil Exports to U.S.

Oil Exporting dummy

ODA/GDP_lagged one year

State Failure dummy

F.H. average score

GDP per capita

Total U.S. Trade/GDP

ODA/GDP

Total U.S. Trade/GDP
.04

-.33***

.15**

.23***
-12**

.16**

GDP per capita F.H. average score
-.22***
.20***

.20***

GDP per capita F.H. average score
-.04
.04

.44***

-.18**

-.05

State Failure dummy
.31***

.38***

-.17**

.06

State Failure dummy
.01

-.02

-.00

.12**

.12**

.55***

.95***

-.03

.02

.17***

.12**

.68***

.23***

.19***

-.04

-.24***

-.11**

.35***

.53***

-.17***

-.18***

-.21***

-.03

.18***

.27***

-.25***

-.24***

-.15**

-.00

-.01

.01

.34***

.07

.04

.03

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

.22***

.18**

-.20***

-.15**

-.11*

.07

.19***

.21***

.50***

.95***

-.12**

.05

.23***

.23***

.62***

.23***

.20***

-.23***

-.22***

-.05

.44***

.54***

-.19***

-.18***

-.15**

-.08

.11**

.19***

-.30***

-.22***

.11**

-.13**

-.00

.04

.09

.32***

.18***

-.12**

.07

.18**

.37***

-.01

-.12**

-.15**

-.03

.03

-.06

.02

-.12**

-.02
…
Correlation of ODA/GDP and Independent Variables 2002-2008
ODA/GDP_lagged one year Oil Exporting dummy Log of Oil Exports to U.S. Total Trade/GDP %Muslim Num. of Terrorist Attacks Cooperation with U.S. Counterterrorism dummy
-.11*
-.08
-.11*
-.28***
-.05
.14**
-.02

-.03

.03

-.03

-.00

Oil Exporting dummy Log of Oil Exports to U.S. Total Trade/GDP %Muslim Num. of Terrorist Attacks Cooperation with U.S. Counterterrorism dummy
.00
-.03
-.03
-.05
.02
…

Correlation of ODA/GDP and Independent Variables 1992-2000
ODA/GDP_lagged one year
.97***

Correlation Matrix of all Variables

APPENDIX 2
COMPLETE STATISTICAL RESULTS
Complete Primary Partial Fixed Effects Models Results

80

Alternative Models Results with Additional Variables

81

82

83

84

85

86

2004

32%
15%
-61%
16%
105%

1710%

Cameroon

Cape Verde

Central African Republic

Chad

Comoros

Congo, Dem. Rep.

87
-27%
-15%

194%
109%
271%

Equatorial Guinea

Eritrea

Ethiopia

11%
-55%

Kenya

Lesotho

10%

-5%
-35%

Guinea

Guinea-Bissau

-2%

25%

Ghana

53%

30%

-95%

-13%

57%
38%

Gabon

Gambia, The

6%

-87%

53%

-48%

21%
47%

Cote d'Ivoire

-92%

-86%

3734%

22%

5%

-8%

28%

Djibouti

-18%

-100%

137%

Burundi

Congo, Rep.

511%

-11%

Burkina Faso

63%

-12%

42%
-39%

-19%

Botswana

48%

Benin

2003

Country Name

Angola

2005

-29%

12%

1197%

-5%

-14%

-36%

-36%

56%

54%

555%

27%

-23%

4352%

-22%

…

33%

51%

88%

-17%

29%

18%

-12%

-10%

-43%

2006

23%

90%

314%

-17%

6%

141%

-35%

-46%

-95%

-67%

39%

34%

-38%

503%

-66%

-37%

24%

-40%

2%

-12%

12%

42%

-14%

-50%

519%

18%

17%

-27%

6%

-63%

-4%

21%

-75%

-49%

3%

23%

10%

-84%

209%

65%

-10%

3%

133%

-43%

2%

86%

29%

24%

2007

-27%

40%

-89%

82%

17%

653%

-53%

127%

120%

-65%

-13%

149%

-97%

54%

38%

41%

93%

248%

-45%

21%

-8%

437%

42%

12%

2008

Country Name

Zimbabwe

Zambia

Uganda

Togo

Tanzania

Swaziland

Sudan

South Africa

Somalia

Sierra Leone

Seychelles

Senegal

Sao Tome and Principe

Rwanda

Nigeria

Niger

Namibia

Mozambique

Mauritius

Mauritania

Mali

Malawi

Madagascar

Liberia

2003

-24%

35%

63%

-15%

-10%

-657%

50%

21%

-2%

-14%

105%

33%

-56%

16%

33%

1%

75%

-13%

9%

415%

16%

0%

6%

105%

2004

-11%

32%

23%

-34%

22%

29%

121%

-8%

-3%

-47%

-100%

6%

2912%

-2%

25%

23%

21%

-17%

60%

-59%

-17%

-2%

-3%

248%

2005

41%

40%

14%

-13%

8%

41%

108%

28%

20%

-25%

0%

-7%

-84%

17%

-15%

56%

-13%

-20%

181%

88%

29%

3%

105%

-13%

-10%

189%

11%

-29%

34%

14%

0%

24%

166%

-1%

1035%

-13%

239%

40%

721%

8%

81%

32%

-44%

-37%

18%

17%

-22%

6%

2006

293%

-45%

26%

275%

41%

93%

-1%

66%

-37%

2%

31%

7%

-49%

20%

-69%

39%

20%

45%

-25%

-14%

-15%

27%

13%

20%

2007

2008

66%

42%

22%

-58%

54%

159%

24%

73%

329%

-22%

-93%

90%

-5%

34%

57%

15%

25%

53%

-31%

161%

2%

15%

30%

179%

APPENDIX 3

SUPPLEMENTAL DATA

Percent of Change in U.S. Annual Foreign Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa
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